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ABSTRACT
The Petite Amateur Navy Satellite (PANSAT) is a communications satellite being
developed at the Naval Postgraduate School by the Space Systems Academic Group. This
thesis is the result of an investigation into all aspects of the project. Research, analyses,
and recommendations were concentrated in the areas of engineering design, testing, orbital
operations, and organization and management. The study identified the upcoming Shuttle
to Mir flights as providing the most attractive orbital parameters for PANSAT operations.
A systems analysis was conducted that attempted to develop and prioritize engineering
design issues requiring more thorough investigation. The chief problem area discovered
by this analysis was in the power production aspect of the Electrical Power System (EPS).
PANSAT was determined to have a negative power margin under certain conditions, and
an even lower power margin than previously believed under most conditions. It is
recommended that the project make satellite development its principal objective (over
education) to maximize the likelihood of success. Student participation in the project is
the single greatest asset of the project, and it remains largely untapped.. Re-organizing the
project to increase student involvement, within the constraints of the Space Systems
curricula, will improve efficiency by easing extraneous requirements on an overtasked
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The Petite Amateur Navy Satellite (PANSAT) is a small spacecraft that is being
designed and constructed at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The project is
primarily an effort of the Space Systems Academic Group (SSAG), with the invaluable
support of faculty and facilities of the Departments of Aeronautical and Astronautical
Engineering, and Electrical and Computer Engineering in particular, and other NPS
departments in general. Design and development of the various aspects of the project are
being conducted as a coordinated effort of the SSAG engineering staff and NPS students.
Student contributions come primarily in the form of theses, formal group and individual
class projects and directed study classes. Faculty contributions consist largely of the
direction of student thesis research or projects, and consultant efforts.
1. PANSAT System Overview
The program consists of the design, development, launch and operation of an
amateur radio band communication satellite. The PANSAT system therefore consists of
the satellite, the ground station(s), and the personnel, software and procedures to conduct
operations. It is anticipated that the satellite will be launched from the Space
Transportation System (STS), a.k.a. Space Shuttle or simply shuttle. PANSAT s concept
of operations (Figure 1) is to operate basically as an orbiting mail server or bulletin board
service, providing store and forward, packet file transfer between ground users.











Figure 1: PANSAT Concept of Operations
a. Satellite Subsystems
The PANSAT satellite (Figure 2) consists of four subsystems:
Spacecraft Structure, Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS), Digital Control Subsystem
(DCS) and the Communication Payload. This relatively simple design does not include
Figure 2: Depiction of the PANSAT Spacecraft
the traditional satellite subsystems of Thermal Control, Guidance Navigation and
(Attitude) Control or Propulsion. The system was designed to minimize complexity and
cost by addressing these subsystems in the most basic manner. By design, thermal control
is passive. This issue will be addressed in Chapter II of this thesis. The spacecraft (s/c)
has no attitude, navigation or guidance sensing, or control capability whatever, and as
such its motion is referred to as "tumbling" even though this may not necessarily be an
accurate description. The s/c's orbital dynamic motion has not as of yet been
characterized completely. Additionally, the satellite has no propulsion capability, and as
such its orbit is completely constrained to that of the launch vehicle (upon launch vehicle
separation) and thereafter upon external forces, principally atmospheric drag. The satellite
subsystems will be briefly described in the following section; however, they will be more
thoroughly treated in the systems status and design analysis sections of this thesis (Chapter
II).
PANSAT's structure acts, as does any s/c structure, as the principle
housing and support mechanism for the s/c subsystems. The structure consists of a 26-
sided polyhedral aluminum housing with 18 square and eight triangular sides. Of the 18
square sides, 17 will be mounted with solar cell arrays and the last square side will be used
for the launch vehicle interconnect baseplate. Four of the triangular sides will be mounted
with the antenna assembly, with the remaining four used for handling, electrical interface
and battery venting (if required). PANSAT can be roughly approximated as a 19 inch
(diameter) sphere.
The EPS is responsible for the generation and distribution of properly
conditioned electrical power for satellite operations. PANSAT subsystems require 12 Vdc
and 5 Vdc. The EPS is comprised of 17 silicon cell solar arrays for primary electrical
power, two Nickel Cadmium batteries for backup power and electrical conditioning,
charging and power regulating circuitry. The current status of the EPS is an issue of
some concern at this stage largely because of the uncertainty of s/c power consumption
characteristics and requirements and ergo, an accurate power margin.
The DCS acts as the Command and Data Handling subsystem and
consists of two independent and identical sides for redundancy. Each side consists
basically of a system controller, analog multiplexer and mass storage device. The DCS in
its capacity as the Command and Data Handling subsystem of the satellite is absolutely
critical to virtually every aspect of s/c operations. Specifically, the DCS is responsible for
all s/c data handling, sensor measurements, communications, housekeeping functions and a
significant percentage of power management functions. There are several design issues of
significant concern that will be addressed in Chapter II.
The communication subsystem's primary operational mode is as a direct
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) system that operates in the 70-cm amateur radio band
with 2.5 MHz of bandwidth and a 436.5 MHz center frequency. It is also capable of
narrow band Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) communications. The communications
subsystem is in fact the mission payload and as such has traditionally been the subject of a
significant portion of student input. Because of this fact, coupled with the rapidly
changing technology of digital communications, the communications system design is
somewhat less mature than other s/c subsystems. The antenna consists of four dipoles in a
tangential turnstile arrangement mounted on the triangular structure plates providing near-
omni-directional coverage and no greater than 10 dB nulls.
b. Ground Station
An integral part of the project is the simultaneous development of the
command ground station to control PANSAT operations. Additionally, the development
of a "Ham Kit" will be pursued in order to simplify access to PANSAT for amateur radio
enthusiasts. This "Ham Kit" will be the basic hardware and software configuration
necessary for communication with PANSAT.
The NPS station will operate as the principal ground station and will
retain command authority through password protection and security measures. In its
capacity as the command ground station, the NPS station will have the capability to
upload commands, operating systems and other software, as well as files, and to download
files and telemetry. Amateur ground stations will be able to up and download files and
download telemetry.
c. Deployed Operations
Post launch operations will consist of operating system upload, on-orbit
test and evaluation, system status determination, normal store-and-forward packet
communication service, telemetry download, monitoring and evaluation, and special
software uploads. The system will be considered to have achieved proof-of-concept when
overall status determination is achieved and the system is capable of performing normal
communications service at the specified Bit Error Rate of 10"\
2. PANSAT Project Development
The PANSAT project, initiated in 1989, was conceived as an educational tool
for NPS based military officer students. The hands-on experience of design, development
and operation of an actual space system was seen as a method of providing invaluable
experience to Space Systems students. The applicability of educational enhancement is
obviously not restricted to Space Systems students, but can be easily seen to apply to
Astroronautical, Electrical and Computer Engineering and Science curricula. The goals of
the PANSAT program [Ref. l:p. 3], in order of precedence, have therefore evolved into
the following:
• To enhance the education of officer students.
• To design, fabricate, test, launch and operate a small satellite.
• To demonstrate the feasibility of small satellites for supporting defense needs.
• To provide a valuable space asset to augment existing military communications in
time of crisis.
The established order of precedence can easily be shown to be crucial to the
funding support of the project. NPS is in the education business, not satellite
construction. The SSAG, likewise is an educational support mechanism and not a
competitive satellite construction facility. Funding support therefore can only be justified
for PANSAT in that it provides enhanced educational experience for officer students. The
last two project goals can only be considered as extraneous in that small satellites have
already been demonstrated as worthwhile efforts for defense support, and that PANSAT'
s
frequency assignment (amateur band), relatively short anticipated orbital lifetime and
limited communications capabilities implies hardly any likelihood of being employed in any
military supporting role.
B. STUDY OBJECTIVES
The project is currently entering what can be characterized as the most critical
development stage to date. PANSAT completed a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) in
May 1993, and an Engineering Design Review (EDR) in March 1994. The next logical
steps in the development cycle will be a design freeze and subsequent Critical Design
Review (CDR); these are anticipated to occur in late 1994. NPS has signed a
Memorandum of Agreement with NASA that begins the process of securing a STS flight
for PANSAT. This agreement will eventually lead to the manifest and launch of PANSAT
from the shuttle via the Hitchhiker program. The project must now begin the crucial
transition from design to product. This transition must begin soon and proceed smoothly
in order for the project to fulfill upcoming commitments.
This thesis was conceived as a tool to provide guidance and direction to this critical
stage of the project in order to improve all possible aspects of the program, ultimately
resulting in the successful launch and operation of PANSAT.
1. Problem Statement and Development
Any project following a system's engineering approach must progress through
development with regard to requirements and project goals. The case may be put forward
that the project has already sufficiently fulfilled the primary goal of educational
enhancement. It is, however, equally true that the educational impact could certainly have
been much greater than it has been to this point. There are approximately 17 theses
related to PANSAT currently in work and 20 theses have been completed since the
project's inception in 1989. Ten of the completed theses were done in the last year alone.
The complication to this picture comes when examining the project's second goal, that of
building, launching and operating a satellite. The problem is simply that goals one and
two are in direct conflict with one another in many ways. How can the project continue to
provide educational opportunities and allow the program to be subject to student
participation shortcomings (level of effort, quality, timing, completeness, etc.) and yet
adhere to any realistic schedule? Documents have been signed and will be signed bringing
commitments to the program. These commitments must be fulfilled for the project to have
a viable future or any likely successors. So when does the SSAG team curtail educational
support and begin in earnest the work of building a satellite communications system?
To this point the vast majority of PANSAT related theses have been
engineering in nature. The SSAG supports the Space Systems curricula which consist of
Space Systems Engineering and Space Systems Operations. In an ideal development
cycle, the system design would be approached as an ideal source of thesis topics for Space
Operations students; they would develop the requirements, the mission, candidate
architectures and trade studies towards a system decision. Engineering students would
then become the project focus as the design transitions from functional to physical and
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became thoroughly specified. Finally, the Operations side would return to the primary
focus as the system transitions from fabrication to deployment and operations. PANSAT,
however was initiated in a somewhat different, perhaps haphazard, manner.
PANSAT's development was initiated as a tool to enhance the education of
Space Systems students by designing and developing a satellite. The type of satellite was
determined by evaluation of the possible designs to which students could meaningfully
contribute. At this point the design work began. As it turns out this is somewhat of a cart
before the horse approach when compared to the "Systems Engineering" approach
outlined above. This basic problem has subsequently led to many of the issues that will be
examined in this thesis.
As a satellite communication system project, the organizational structure
currently employed to carry out this effort can be characterized as insufficient, inefficient
and unwieldy. The PANSAT engineering team has seven personnel working
approximately full time and an eighth part time. The effort is insufficient in that a typical
competitive space contractor would likely have in excess of 50 dedicated personnel to an
undertaking of PANSAT's magnitude; fiscal commitments are of a similar magnitude less
than typically found.
1
The effort can be seen as inefficient in that the contributions of faculty and
students are on a completely voluntary basis. What this implies is that the level of effort
and area of contribution is not under any positive control. Thesis students can come and
'Personal Conversation with Dr. Rudy Panholzer, 10 June 1994.
go at will, and work on topical areas of their interest at the time that fits into their
curricular schedule. Whereas there is nothing wrong in itself with this fact, it often does
not coincide well with project priorities and timing. Likewise faculty contribution is
equally difficult to influence, and is subject to the particular faculty member's ability to
solicit sponsorship relative to the project. Few faculty have the financial or time
availability or flexibility to contribute significantly without fiscal sponsorship and support.
The project is unwieldy with regard to the management issues involved in
coordinating the engineering team's efforts with those of faculty and students. The
project's biggest single difficulty may be that there is not currently in place any
organizational structure to adequately obtain sufficient personnel support and to direct and
coordinate the efforts of those personnel who are involved.
The purposes of this thesis, therefore, were to examine the above detailed
concerns, to develop the issues to which these concerns lead, and to make
recommendations that will ultimately lead to an improved development process and
thereby to a system with a higher likelihood of success. With regard to this concept, the
thesis will examine the PANSAT project from all feasible aspects, including but not limited
to: engineering, testing, process, organizational, managerial and operational issues and
decisions. To summarize, the end result of this thesis was intended to be (loosely) viewed
and employed as a systems management guide. The "system" in this instance shall be
defined in the System's Engineering sense as the sum of all those facilities, personnel,
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processes and components that are required in the design, fabrication, testing, deployment
and operations of the PANSAT satellite and ground station.
2. Research Questions
The primary research question was: What are the critical current issues
affecting the overall status of the PANSAT project and how should those issues best be
addressed to carry the project through to the successful completion of its primary goals?
Subsidiary research questions include:
• What is the current status of each subsystem of the project development structure?
• How does the project proceed through the next critical development steps of a
design freeze and critical design review?
• What managerial, engineering, organizational and operational techniques and
recommendations will best guide the project to a successful completion?
These questions outline the framework in which this thesis was initiated. Other issues
naturally follow as solutions to the above questions are considered and will be posed and
addressed in later chapters.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
As a result of an informal program review conducted in April 1993, LT T.J. Sharps
of the Space Technology division of the Naval Research and Development Command, the
need for a PANSAT, Student Project Officer (SPO) was documented [Ref. 2]. That
position was filled by the author in January of 1994, primarily as a stepping stone towards
research for this thesis. Although there was no job description associated with this title,
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part of the scope of this thesis was to determine what role the SPO would play with regard
to the PANSAT project.
The scope of this thesis was to address the issues outlined above and provide
recommendations for the improved performance of the project in as many aspects as
possible. Succeeding chapters will address the issues in the following manner: Chapter II
will address engineering and design status and issues. Chapter III will address the status
of the PANSAT testing program. Chapter IV will examine operational issues and
concerns. Chapter V will concern management and organizational considerations and
description of SPO activities and recommendations for future responsibilities. Chapter VI
will provide conclusions, recommendations and set the stage for follow-up projects and
theses. It was the intent of this thesis to emphasize issues and concerns that were
determined not to have been adequately addressed or that remain unresolved. The final
effort of this thesis was to prioritize those unresolved issues where possible, so that an





This thesis in general, and this systems analysis in particular were approached
from a systems engineering perspective. Systems engineering is defined as a process by
which a stated need (objective) is transformed into a life cycle balanced set of product and
process descriptions [Ref. 3:p. 2]. These descriptions are incrementally matured
throughout the development of the system. They are used to plan and implement the
development, fabrication, verification, deployment, operation, support, training, and
disposal of the system.
This thesis will primarily deal with two of PANSAT's objectives (1) to
enhance the education of officer students and (2) to design, fabricate, test, launch, and
operate a small satellite. The PANSAT system, therefore, consists not only of the
satellite, ground station(s), and the personnel and procedures that develop, fabricate, test,
launch, and operate the satellite and ground stations, but also the personnel and facilities
involved in all aspects of the education and training of the officer students associated with
the project. This chapter will concentrate on that portion of the PANSAT system




A functional description of the satellite and ground station combination is best
approached iteratively. On a large scale, the project is a satellite communication system
that provides store and forward, packetized communications via spread spectrum amateur
radio communications. The spacecraft receives packetized communications from a ground
station, stores them in memory and re-transmits those messages at a later time to other
ground stations. This overview now permits a more focused examination of the
functionality of its components.
Within the satellite, a functional component description is now more easily
described. Signals are received by the communications payload; the DCS (command and
data handling) converts the signal format and stores the message for future re-
transmission. The EPS generates and stores solar power, and provides conditioned power
to the customer components within the satellite. The spacecraft structure supports,
houses and provides protective enclosure (from the space environment) to all components;
the DCS further provides control of all mission and housekeeping functions of the
spacecraft. Similar, but less complex functionality can be defined for ground stations. A
ground station transmits and receives signals via an antenna and transceiver system, while
command and data handling are accomplished via a personal computer and a terminal




The overall project status of PANSAT can best be described as mid-design phase.
The project completed its PDR in 1993; however, upon examination of the significant
design changes that have occurred since that time, it is readily apparent that the PDR was
pre-mature. The most significant change since the PDR was with regard to the
communications payload. The demodulator design was determined to be power, schedule,
and cost prohibitive, and the communications payload was changed from analog to digital
implementation. The EDR of 1994 saw the project closer to what would normally be
considered to be the maturity of a project at the PDR stage. The design of PANSAT is
complete and stable at the systems level and at the functional level for subsystems. The
physical implementation of more detailed design work is currently ongoing.
Any status assessment of a project of this magnitude must be general in nature
simply due to the number of components, subsystems and assemblies under consideration.
The subsystem status sections of this chapter will, therefore, be largely non-specific.
Particular components of significant interest for various reasons will be singled out for
expanded discussion.
1. Spacecraft Structure
The basic spacecraft structure is a 26 sided polyhedron. Seventeen square
sides provide mounting for solar arrays; the remaining square side is reserved to mount the
launch vehicle interface. The remaining eight sides are triangular shaped, four will provide
mounting for the communication antennae, and the remaining will provide handling,
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electrical (Hitchhiker) interface, and battery venting (if required). The remaining function
of the structure is to provide component environmental protection, housing, and
mounting. The next major step in the development of the spacecraft structure is the
detailed design drawings to include, housing locations and dimensions, wiring locations,
through holes and structural connectivity.
PANSAT's size can be roughly approximated by a 19 inch sphere. Early in its
design stages the decision was made to forego any attitude stabilization capability, or even
any attitude determination capability in the interest of reduced cost and complexity. The
resulting design was determined to be the optimum design for solar power generation in
the absence of spacecraft stabilization. The flat sides were chosen to provide ease of
design and mounting for solar arrays. While it was not the intent of this thesis to second
guess decisions beyond any possibility of reconsideration, the question of this choice for a
basic structural design has to be raised in the event a follow on PANSAT becomes a
reality. As will be developed later in this chapter, power is a critical consideration for
PANSAT. The final power margin may in fact be negative, and many subsystem design
options have been determined principally on the basis of minimizing power consumption.
PANSAT's objectives have already been compromised in two ways. First, the original
goal of using PANSAT as a platform for secondary experiments will not be met, except in
terms of software upload experiments. Secondly, end performance will undoubtedly suffer
given that power consumption will override other selection criteria. Additionally, this
16
design requires an omni-directional antenna and the increased power requirement thereby
incurred.
a. Status
The basic structure design has been completed and square panels have
been fabricated for solar array mounting. Those panels/solar arrays are presently in the
late stages of acceptance, qualification and functional testing. The current schedule calls
for the basic design of the remaining plates, equipment housing, and most structural
components to be completed in October 1994. Detailed design drawings, and fabrication
for remaining plates, components, and subassemblies is scheduled from March to June
1995.
b. Issues
PANSAT will be deployed from the shuttle from a Get-Away-Special
(GAS) canister. The separation method is via a mechanical spring that pushes the satellite
out of the canister when commanded. The spring is attached to a pusher plate that
touches the adapter on PANSAT. The spring is held depressed until desired, and the
adapter is held against the pusher plate by a clamp. This clamp is pyrotechnically released
and PANSAT is pushed out of the GAS can. Figure 3 shows the ejection mechanism as it
appears after the Marman clamp has released and a payload has been ejected. A student
thesis specifically addressing the launch vehicle interface adapter design will be completed
in September 1994. This is an area of particular concern since early indications are that
the adapter, which is permanently fixed to PANSAT, will shadow the solar arrays.
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Another complexity decision was that individual solar arrays are pure series, which means
that if a single cell is shadowed, it generates no current and that entire array generates no
power. Again, the possibility seems to exist that under certain geometry up to four panels
will be shadowed at a given time.
Figure 3: GAS Ejector Mechanism
The possibility has been raised of a modification to the adapter plate to
reduce or eliminate shadowing of solar arrays [Ref.4:p. 84]. This may be the best option
to eliminate shadowing, and is the subject of current research. The design that has been
selected will eliminate direct shadowing (direct incidence), but off-angle shadowing has
not been examined. The process by which a modification to a space qualified component
must be fully understood, and carefully pursued. PANSAT will be integrated into the
GAS canister by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. The proper approach to
18
modification is to specify exact requirements to NASA Goddard. The issue may then fall
to one of funding.
Structural design progressed early and rapidly in the course of
PANSAT' s development cycle. For obvious reasons, after initial basic decisions were
made, it was the simplest subsystem to develop. Progressively detailed design has slowed
while other subsystems catch up in maturity. It is symptomatic of many aspects of the
PANSAT project that many different areas seem to occasionally stagnate while awaiting
inputs from other areas. This particular concern will be more thoroughly developed in
Chapter V.
c. Recommendations
The adapter plate options include pursuing a modification of the
anticipated adapter plate, flying with the plate as is, or obtaining an entirely new plate. At
this point, there is some confusion with respect to what choices are available for adapter
plates. Some documentation has been received indicating the possibility of the existence
of different plate sizes. Confirmation of this possibility has not as of yet been obtainable.
This question should be addressable through the CPR process, and should be pursued with
the earliest iteration possible.
Follow on programs should perform more in-depth trade studies with
regard to basic spacecraft structure. Specifically, is a relatively simple and inexpensive
attitude control system (e.g., gravity gradient stabilization) a more attractive option? That
choice would allow for a more directional antenna, and thereby reduced transmitter
19
power; it would also provide the ability to design for more efficient solar power
generation.
2. Communications Payload
The PANSAT communication subsystem is, due to the nature of the mission,
the primary (and only) payload for the spacecraft. It is designed to be a simplex (single
channel up and down link), spread spectrum, amateur band system. PANSAT will operate
in the 70 centimeter (wavelength) band at a center frequency of 436.5 MHz with 2.5 MHz
of bandwidth. The communication payload is in actuality a combination of the radio
frequency (RF) subsystem and a portion of the DCS. Figure 4 presents a schematic view
of side A of the RF subsystem.
The RF subsystem provides redundancy by employing two identical, separate
and switchable sides (A and B). A side of the RF subsystem for a receiving signal begins
at the antenna; the signal is then routed through a side (A/B) selector switch, a
transmit/receive switch, and into a low noise amplifier (LNA). The boosted signal then is
mixed with a 366.5 MHz local oscillator (LO) where the resulting difference of 70 MHz is
filtered as the intermediate frequency (IF)
2
. At this point the IF is routed to the DCS,
where it is down converted and sent to the analog to digital (A/D) converter where it is
converted to digital data, then to the PARAMAX 3 demodulator where it is de-spread and
demodulated. [Ref. 5: p. 24] A transmission is accomplished somewhat differently than a
2
Briefing by Steve Huneke, for SS-4003, PANSAT Design Meetings, 26 July 1994.
VARAMAX is a UNISYS Company.
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pure reverse process. Data is prepared for transmission by modulating with a pseudo-
noise sequence and then with a Bi-phase Shift Keyed (BPSK) modulator. The signal is
then routed back to the RF subsystem where it is upconverted from IF (via the same LO)
to 436.5 MHz, boosted through a high power amplifier (HPA) and then routed through
the same switching to the antenna. The system can alternately be operated in simple


















To RF Section B
Figure 4: Schematic of RF Subsystem (Side A)
a. Status
Systems level design of the communication subsystem is complete and
detailed design of the system is progressing. Brassboard development of the system is
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anticipated by October 1994, although the physical implementation of some detailed
design aspects, such as the HPA and the A/B switch have not yet been satisfied. Student
efforts are presently addressing these areas. In particular a detailed RF subsystem and
RF/DCS interface design effort is scheduled for completion in September 1994. The
results of this design work will likely change the above described signal processing in
order to better realize redundancy and reliability requirements. What is anticipated is a
switching network allowing either side of the RF to use multiple LO's, IF oscillators and
amplifiers.
The PARAMAX demodulator is a design decision that warrants
consideration from several aspects. This option provides state of the art, digital signal
processing at greatly decreased power consumption, higher data rates and decreased
complexity. The other option, until late 1993, had been an analog design developed by LT
Arnie Brown [Ref 6]. It was subsequently determined that the demodulator design
required by an analog system was too complex, large, and power hungry to be easily
adapted for PANSAT.4 At about the same time, research identified a digital off-the-shelf
option which performed all required functions within power and size budgets. That item is
the PARAMAX, PA- 100 Spread Spectrum Demodulator.
b. Issues
The PA- 100 seems to be the answer to many tough problems for
PANSAT. There is a downside, however. The PA- 100 was originally thought to be
4
Personal Conversations with David Weiding regarding his thesis research findings, August 1994.
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available in a Military Specification (MEL-SPEC) model, but that does not now seem to be
the case. The option exists for the SSAG to purchase a production run for MIL-SPEC
PA-100's but at a price of approximately $60,000 this option is apparently cost
prohibitive. What then are the implications and risks of using a plastic PA- 100? The
known concerns are two-fold. How will the chip stand up to the temperature and
pressure extremes of space, and launch vibration and shocks ? What effect will out-
gassing have on the rest of satellite components?
The brassboard demodulator should begin environmental and functional
testing in September of 1994. This test sequence should resolve the first question of
environmental sturdiness. The question remains about out-gassing and its effects on the
rest of the spacecraft. A larger question with more far reaching implication is an
immediate follow on as a result of these two. What is the pass fail criteria for these tests
and what options are available if the PA- 100fails?
The anticipated antenna design for PANSAT was developed in 1991 by a
thesis student. The resulting recommendation was for a tangential turnstile antenna in
order to provide the nearest possible approximation of an omni-directional radiation
pattern. [Ref. 7] The analysis performed met the criteria [Ref. 8:p. 4] of no nulls of
greater than 10 dB. There was some concern given to polarization losses which could only
be quantified statistically. This analysis used the entire PANSAT structure in the antenna
model based on the relative size of PANSAT as compared to a wavelength (roughly .7
wavelengths). The results when the structure were included were significantly different
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from that of the antenna arrangement alone. That study was performed, however, without
incorporation of the adapter as part of the structure.
c. Recommendations
The project has painted itself into somewhat of a corner with respect to
the demodulator issue. There exists little or no corporate or research based knowledge of
what likelihood a non-MIL-SPEC chip has of performing in an extended space
environment. Will the subsystem's environmental testing be rigorous enough to determine
potential shortcomings?
The next months of payload development are absolutely critical to the
entire PANSAT project. The recommendations of this thesis towards reducing program
risk are numerous:
• Thermal analysis must be accelerated to the point of an accurate thermal range for
not only PANSAT but for the PA- 100 location.
• Research for any lessons learned with regard to non-space rated chips in space.
• Develop fall back options for a demodulator design if the PA- 100 does not succeed;
these include investigation of adequate off-the-shelf radios and the purchase of MIL-
SPEC PA- 100 chips given the significant capital outlay.
• Develop pass fail criteria for environmental testing of the PA- 100. Determine what
level of out-gassing is acceptable and what is not.
A student is beginning thesis work in the area of antenna design. This
should clarify that aspect of the communications system and allow for an increasingly
accurate link budget. An antenna radiation pattern model including polarization effects
will also satisfy some EMC testing issues that will be addressed in Chapter III.
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3. Command And Data Handling
Command and data handling duties are performed by the Digital Control
Subsystem (DCS). This critical subsystem coordinates the activities of the EPS, the RF
communication subsystem, as well as the basic spacecraft operations and missions. The
DCS functionally consists of three principal modules; a system controller, an analog
multiplexer (MUX), and a mass storage unit. The current DCS design is redundant,
providing identical A and B sides, similar to the RF communications subsystem. An
integral part of the DCS is the Peripheral Control Bus (PCB), which provides the primary
electrical interface for communication and control between the system controller and other
DCS modules as well as the other spacecraft subsystems. [Ref. 9:p. 2]
The system controller module will house a M80C186XL processor, a serial
communications controller, a counter timer, a peripheral interface, error-detection and
correction random access memory (RAM), and programmable read only memory (PROM)
as the principal digital controller. The input to the DCS from the RF communication
subsystem is 70 MHz IF. The system controller therefore contains many RF
communication components. The PARAMAX demodulator, analog to digital and digital
to analog converters, quadrature downconverters, BPSK modulator, PN code generator,
two low pass filters, and a band pass (IF) filter are all housed in the system controller
module.
The analog multiplexer provides analog to digital conversion of temperature
sensor data for telemetry monitoring and reporting. The mass storage unit provides four
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megabytes of volatile static RAM and 1/2 megabyte of non-volatile flash memory for data
storage. This is the principal implementation of PANSAT' s communication mission as a
mail server. The mass storage is required to store packet information, transmission
records, and telemetry history.
Switching between DCS sides A and B is accomplished via a watchdog timer.
Normal operation of the DCS provides for periodic reset of the watchdog timer (interval
TBD). If the watchdog timer counts down, this indicates a DCS malfunction and brings
about a system reset. This will require operating system and software uploads from the
command ground station and will switch spacecraft controller to the previously idle
controller side. The watchdog timer is a component of the EPS.
a. Status
The development of the DCS hardware is, in general, in the breadboard
phase. The analog MUX design is approaching prototype, and the system controller is
tied in many ways to the RF communication subsystem development schedule. A
complete system controller development board should be completed and ready for testing
by early fiscal year 95. The system controller is the key module within the DCS and will
appropriately receive the primary development effort in the near future. Implementation
of the remaining two modules is nevertheless tied in many ways to that of the system
controller. The design of system controller interfaces is ongoing. Interfaces have been
defined but not specifically assigned.
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The question arises of the necessity for redundancy in the design of the
DCS. The majority of components within the DCS (with the notable exception of the PA-
100 chip) are radiation hardened components, and therefore much more resistant of single
event upsets. The need for error free operation of this critical system can not be
overstated, however. Even considering the added complexity and expense of designing
redundant sides into the DCS, it is a sound decision to provide this increased reliability.
b. Recommendations
The primary issue of concern for the DCS is software. As with any
digital controller, software design and coding will make or break the system's ability to
reliably perform its mission. It is absolutely critical to emphasize early and thorough
testing in the subsystem's development cycle. The development of a spacecraft simulator
is the most effective way to provide sufficient testing. A student thesis involving a
simulator development on LabVIEW software is scheduled for completion in December
1994. This will only be the first stage in the development of the system. This is
particularly true when the level of design that will be available as that thesis nears
completion is considered.
The mechanisms for switching between sides A and B bear even closer
and more thorough scrutiny. As the hardware and software designs solidify, it is essential
to develop every possible scenario that could result in a system reset. As a system reset is
currently defined, this is a drastic event with significant operational implications with
regard to ground station requirements. Are there other conditions or non-catastrophic
27
malfunctions that will cause expiration of the watchdog timer? If so, is it possible to do a
less drastic DCS side switch, specifically, one that does not require a full operating
system/software upload? What other malfunctions will cause a DCS shutdown?
As will be addressed in the next section, there is the distinct possibility
that operational scheduling will be required to overcome power generation shortcomings.
The simplest and most effective way of dealing with a potentially negative power margin is
to minimize spacecraft power consumption while batteries are re-charged. Design
decisions are now being made which may be affected by this eventuality. The ability to
easily switch to a reduced power mode for specified time periods should be a DCS
requirement. The most likely option for a reduced power mode is to switch the
transmitter and receiver off or to standby. How quickly can these components be
powered up to be ready for operation? What are the power consumption savings from
this possibility?
4. Electrical Power Subsystem
The EPS provides primary electrical power in the form of 15.2 Volts dc
generated from 17 silicon cell solar arrays, and secondary power from Nickel Cadmium
(NiCd) batteries. In addition to solar arrays and batteries, the EPS consists of power
conditioning electronics, distribution circuitry, temperature, current, and voltage sensors,
and interfaces with the PCB. The EPS functional requirements call for an average
minimum power of 21.5 Watts at 15.2 Vdc from the solar arrays at end of life (two year
mission). A positive power margin is also a specified requirement. [Ref 8:p. 10]
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The EPS contains the previously mentioned watchdog timer as a control and
interface device for the DCS. This clock will effectively monitor DCS status and under
normal operations be periodically updated. If the watchdog timer times out before being
reset it will be indicative of a significant DCS malfunction and will cause a system reset.
This reset will bring up the opposite side of the DCS. Many operations of the EPS are
controlled by the DCS via the peripheral control bus. The principal power consumers in
fact are the three modules of the DCS along with the transmitter and receivers. Other
secondary consumers include power dissipated in isolation diodes and converters in the
power generation side of the EPS.
a. Status
The particulars of the final EPS design remain in a pre-breadboard phase.
The primary hold-up in many aspects of EPS and thereby spacecraft development is a
battery selection decision. The final battery decision is likely by October 1994 at which
time EPS designs will readily fall into place. A prototype EPS should be ready by early
1995. After the battery decision is made, extensive battery characterization tests will
begin upon receipt, and these tests will fill in many of the missing details. There have been
numerous power margin calculations over the development of the EPS. Finer power
requirements are increasingly available from customer subsystem and component designs.
With these data the PANSAT team believes the power margin to be approximately +10%.
The issue of power margin is of critical importance to PANSAT for obvious reasons, not
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the least of which is that the results have significant impact on many other design issues
throughout the spacecraft.
b. Issues
(1) Power Margin. Historically PANSAT' s power margin calculations
have been a source of confusion and debate. The latest calculations have been determined
to be energy margin not power margin. While the energy margin may in fact be useful
information, the accurate determination of power margins is a necessary first step to
quantify system operations. The current calculations use solar cell voltage and current
values corrected after discrepancies from the solar cell manufacturer were discovered.
The average power available is then determined based on the results of a program written
to determine the average effective illuminated area of PANSAT when rotated through In
steradians with respect to the sun. This area was divided by the total area of the 17 solar
panels to determine the percent of PANSAT illuminated. This average illuminated area
was multiplied by the power generated by a panel normal to the solar incidence and the
result was labeled as Average Available Power. This method is not sufficient because the
power margin should be used to compare power generated versus power required under
specific scenarios, not over a period of time. In other words, the average available power
has little utility in this respect.
It was decided to develop power margins for specific scenarios to
better understand the operational implications of the EPS design. Power generated in a
given array is based on a basically constant array voltage and a current that varies with
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solar incidence angle. Each solar array consists of 32 solar cells connected in series. The
cells have end of life performance of .478 volts and .282 amps. End of life array voltage is
determined by:
Array Voltage^! = Voltageeoi/Cell • # Cells (series) - Wiring losses
With an estimated .02 volt wiring loss the array voltage is therefore 15.27 Volts. The
maximum power generated by any array is then given by:
Powermax = Currenteoi • Array Voltageeol
which yields a maximum power per panel of 4.01 Watts. PANSAT' s total power
generated for a variety of sun orientations were calculated by the following formula:
P = Zi (V«I»cos 0j ) = Xi Powermax • cos 8j
where 6j = solar incidence angle on illuminated panel i. Figure 5 shows the three specific
orientations which were examined analytically, and the associated coordinate axes (X axis,
not shown, is defined by the right hand rule). Solar incidence was assumed to be directly
perpendicular to the figures (i.e., in the -X direction).




Figure 5: Orientations Analyzed for Power Margin
The power generated for orientation I was calculated based on one
panel normal to the sun, and four panels having incidence angles of 45°. This yielded a
power of 16.49 Watts. Orientation II involved a slightly more complicated calculation.
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Solar incidence was assumed normal at the intersection of the two middle panels. Based
on PANSAT' s octahedral basic design all joint intersections are 45°, so the two middle
panels have an incidence angle of 22.5°, the two adjoining panels (middle row) have
incidence angles of 67.5°. The top and bottom panels' power calculations are more easily
determined by considering two incidence angles (rotated about different axes) rather than
a single incidence angle. The top and bottom panels that are just left of the middle have
incidence angles of 22.5° (about Z axis) and 45° (about Y axis). Similarly, the remaining
two panels have incidence angles of 67.5° and 45°. This yielded a power of 19.21 Watts.
Orientation III incidence angles were calculated using the same methods as described
above. Incidence angles were 45° for the two outer middle panels, and the four top and
bottom panels had incidence angles of 45° about both axes. The power from this
orientation was 19.01 Watts.
The initial implications of this analysis is that the power in general is
directly related to the number of illuminated solar panels. More evidence of this was
obtained by rotating orientation II 20° about the Y axis. This brings a ninth panel into
view and when the incidence angles are adjusted, the power from this aspect is calculated
to be 19.52 Watts. The complication to this analysis is that the presence of the base plate
panel has not yet been considered. The worst case would be with orientation I with the
base plate normal to the sun, the power generated here will be only 12.18 Watts. For
orientation II, the effect of the adapter as one of the panels varies from a 3.98 to a 1.17
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Watt reduction in power. For orientations I and HI, the reduction varies from 4.31 Watts
(normal plate) to 2.15 Watts.
Current power requirements are largely based on the EPS
supporting the three DCS modules, and the receiver and transmitter. Additionally, the
dissipated power in isolation diodes, current sensors, battery charging, as well as converter
inefficiencies were included. The principal power consumers require 10.85 Watts, but due
to EPS converter inefficiency of 75%, draws 14.47 Watts. The remaining dissipated
power boosts the required power to 15.42 Watts. When comparing this requirement with
the generation capabilities examined previously, it is apparent that PANSAT will operate
on a negative power budget under some sun orientations. While full statistical analysis
will be required to determine probabilities, the basic situation is relatively simple.
Assuming completely random motion, the adapter panel will not be illuminated roughly
50% of the time. When this is the case, a positive power margin is a strong likelihood
(i.e., no orientations could be determined with less than 16.49 Watts generated, this
corresponds to a +6.3% power margin). Under most orientations where the adapter is
illuminated, those conditions that are likely to have a negative power margin are when a
relatively small number of panels are illuminated (e.g., orientation I) and the adapter is a
panel of low incidence angle. The power rises rapidly as additional panels are illuminated;
orientation I rotated through only 10° about the Z axis produces 17.3 Watts, a .8 Watt
increase. It should be noted that the potential shadowing of additional panels from the
base plate has not been considered in this analysis.
33
(2) Battery Selection. The battery design candidates have been
narrowed to a choice of non-space qualified NiCd batteries, one consisting of F- cells, and
one of D-cells. The overriding cost of space qualified batteries ($300,000) ruled this
option out immediately, given budget limitations. The battery decision has narrowed to a
trade off of performance issues. The F-cell has a capacity of 6.5 Amp-hours and a; the D-
cell has a 5.7 Amp-hour capacity. [Ref. 4] Obviously, the higher capacity is desirable, but
the question is what battery capabilities are required. One specific, answerable question is
what is the required capacity of the battery and therefore the cells. Cell capacity
requirements are based on eclipse power requirements [Ref 10:p. 89] and can be derived
from the following formula:
Required Energy = P • td = Supplied Energy = C • VB • DOD
where: P = Required Power, td = Duration of eclipse, C = Capacity (required), VB = Bus
Voltage, and DOD = Depth of Discharge. Using a bus voltage of 12 Volts and 10% DOD,
all that remains is a determination of required energy. The only eclipse power
requirements are 14.47 Watts to converters to run the DCS and RF subsystems, and
dissipated power (.32 Watts) in the battery isolation diodes. Eclipse time has been
calculated to be approximately 40% per orbit, which equates to 36 minutes. Required
energy therefore is 8.87 Watt-hours, but given a two battery system, the single battery
requirement is half load and therefore 4.44 Watt-hours. Equating required energy and
supplied energy and solving for C gives required capacity of 3.7 Amp-hours.
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The battery design calls for a DOD of 10% to provide for the high
cycle requirements imposed by PANSAT's low altitude orbit. A typical space NiCd
battery cycle life versus Depth of Discharge curve can be approximated by:
% DOD = -30.74»log, ( # Cycles/1.2xl05 )
The number of cycles can be approximated based on 14 orbits per day for two years; this
gives 10,227 cycles. This converts to a depth of discharge of 32.9%. Entering the 10%
requirement into the formula yields a number of cycles equal to 56,738, which is more
than 1 1 years. [Ref. 10:p. A-82] Does the charge performance differ significantly for the
different type cells? Is the volume required for F-cells within the size limitations of the
space allotted to the battery system?
c. Recommendations
A better analysis of power margin is warranted. A model generating
power production considering attitude dynamics should be developed. Statistical
evaluation of the resulting power margins will yield an energy margin and therefore better
information about operational effects, and battery requirements. Pursuing the definition of
reduced power modes will allow an improved energy margin by allowing operational
adjustment of power consumption. These efforts are overdue. The current power margin
by which the EPS design is proceeding, as was previously stated, is an energy margin.
The power production prediction was based on a computer model that determined an
average percentage of PANSAT illuminated. This percentage was converted to an
average available power. The calculated average was 19.45 Watts. Utilizing the method
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described above, only one orientation examined was able to produce a power of this
magnitude.
The algorithm and data used to produce the 19.45 Watt average power
value were examined for possible error. The algorithm could not be debugged to
determine accuracy, so the inspection turned to the data. The data output was effective
illuminated surface area of solar panels for particular orientations. The methodology
employed saw orientation I as the basic orientation. This orientation was rotated at 5°
intervals through 90° about the z-axis. After each increment the satellite was rotated (6°
incrementally) about the y- axis through 360°. The values for the three orientations
considered manually above were compared to output data; in all three cases the resultant
powers computed differed by less than .1 Watt. However, when the basic orientations
were rotated about the y-axis, the results were drastically different. For example,
orientation III was rotated through 11° and the resulting power was manually calculated
to be 19.52 Watts. The power from the algorithm was 21.81 Watts, a difference of 2.3
Watts from an 11° rotation. This implies a rotation of only 11° which incurs a 10%
increase in power (or surface area). The mechanics of this rotation simply do not agree
with these results. That rotation brings an additional solar panel into view, but with an
incidence angle of only 79°, this corresponds to .82 Watts. Of the seven panels already in
view, five have higher incidence angles (i.e., lower power) from this rotation and only two
have lower incidence angles (i.e., higher power). Another scenario was considered.
Beginning with orientation I, a 45° rotation about the y-axis (Figure 6) gives the exact
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same view as orientation III rotated 90° about the x-axis (Figure 7, x-axis by the right
hand rule). The rotated view in Figure 6 is given in the data as generating 23.22 Watts,
but this has been shown to be identical to orientation III (rotated to no effect on power)
which has been calculated manually and by the algorithm to generate only 19.01 Watts.
This clearly demonstrates a significant error in the algorithm upon which all prior power
calculations have been based. All possible scenarios have not been calculated manually,
but the average power figure of 19.45 Watts is clearly too high, perhaps on the order of 2




Figure 6: Orientation I and its 45° Rotation About the Y-Axis
•^®L
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Figure 7: Orientation III and its 90° Rotation About the X-Axis
A thorough and complete review of the operational states of the
spacecraft subsystems is absolutely essential. States that reduce power consumption
enable operational plans that will overcome power generation deficiencies. The initial
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reaction of all subsystem coordinators to this question is that there are no lower power
states available. From the DCS requiring at least standby power to all major components
(of the operating side) to the requirement to continuously monitor sensor telemetry for
battery charging circuits, the answer is universally negative. This author is highly
doubtful that there exist no available options for reducing power consumption from the
basic state. It is strongly recommended that renewed effort be directed to this question.
Considering the above calculations, it is recommended that a thorough
trade study of the battery decisions be performed. Charge rate, volume and weight
comparisons at a minimum should be considered along with the capacity for the best
choice. The DOD issue also impacts the study. Is the DOD versus cycle life curve used
above applicable to non-space rated NiCd's? If the answer is yes, then why design to such
a restrictive limit? While the capacity of the D-cell is somewhat less, it is reasonable to
believe this capacity is still more than sufficient to power PANSAT through eclipse.
Furthermore, if the use of 10% DOD proves to be as conservative as is apparent, the
choice of a lower capacity may be even more secure. As with all systems design issues,
one decision impacts the next, which impacts the first, etc. With regard to this
complication, in this case the order seems simpler. An accurate model of power
production should be the immediate high priority effort. Almost every other EPS issue
hinges on these results.
Another consideration for the power analysis is of course power
consumption. Are there any components not yet positively determined that are
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replaceable with lower power ones? Specifically, is there an HPA that meets
requirements that consumes less power than the current options? Is a lower power amp
feasible with consideration to the link budget? Current link budgets typically consider a 5°
or 10° minimum elevation in link margins. If PANSAT gets an orbital inclination of
greater than 28.5° can realistic communication windows be achieved if the minimum
elevation for a link margin went up to 15°? In other words how much link margin is there
to trade-offfor lower performing RF components in order to help a beleaguered power
budget?
5. Thermal Control
Another of the design decisions made early on in the development of PANSAT
was to design a satellite that could operate without active thermal control. This decision
was reinforced as power budgets were examined and it became increasingly apparent that
active control was a luxury that simply could not be achieved. Initial reports of the
findings of a transient thermal analysis indicate internal temperatures for PANSAT should
be maintained within the range of 0° C to + 40° C. This range is well within the safe
operating range of the electronic components. This is a significant benefit to the program
as little backup was available if the analysis had not proved so benign.
The detailed results of the transient analysis must be examined in particular for
one issue. The battery performance is very dependent on operating temperature, and it
Veronal conversation with Dan Sakoda, PANSAT Systems Engineer, 4 Aug 1994.
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requires a much narrower range than that given above. Therefore the ability to obtain and
maintain an acceptable battery operating temperature has not yet been resolved.
It is unlikely that facilities will be made available for PANSAT to be able to
perform a thermal balance test. The question should be asked though; how thorough a
test is required in order simply to provide some validation to the thermal analyses that
have to date driven PANSAT's thermal control system (or lack thereof). If there is a way
to perform a less rigorous test than a fully developed Military Standard thermal balance
test, every effort should be made to pursue that option.
6. Ground Stations
PANSAT ground stations under development fall under two separate
categories. The command ground station will be located on the NPS campus; the
particular location will be determined at a later date. The SSAG team is simultaneously
developing the design for a generic "Ham Kit." The kit will be designed with two primary
goals in mind, that of providing an amateur radio operator with all necessary hardware and
software to communicate with PANSAT, and to do so at as inexpensive a cost to the
amateur as possible in order to maximize participation.
The SSAG currently has an operating base station, routinely communicating
with other amateur satellites, such as the OSCAR series. The components of the base
station that will form the basis of the PANSAT command station are the transceiver,
terminal node controller (TNC), and personal computer running packet communications
software. The PANSAT station design and construction will involve adapting the current
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base station into one compatible with PANSAT. This implies the use of the satellite's
modem, integrated into the TNC, a PANSAT optimized antenna, and the specific
PANSAT software that is not available "off-the-shelf."
a. Command Ground Station
The design and fabrication of the command ground station are in many
respects, either already in place, or fall largely under the domain of the communications
subsystem or DCS development. The RF subsystem of the communications payload
requires integration into the existing base station. Specifically, the spread spectrum,
modulator and demodulator (PARAMAX) components must be integrated into the
transceiver/TNC interface, the PANSAT antenna must be fabricated and mounted, and
command and control software must be completed.
There are several operational issues which must be addressed as
development proceeds. The Federal Communications Commission requires that a ground
station maintains a log of all spread spectrum transmissions for a period of one year
following the last downlinked entry. These station records must include sufficient
information to enable the commission to demodulate the transmissions. An operations
manual and guide must be developed as well as training procedures for ground station
operation.
The integration design work is largely completed up to the breadboard
stage. Further efforts are dependent on DCS and communication subsystem schedules.
The ground station antenna [Ref. 7] design is that of a thesis student. The design of both
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the ground station and satellite have been completely based on one particular thesis that
selected the antennae based on a simulation in 1991. Since fewer interdependencies exist
for the ground station antenna the timing is less critical than for the satellite; however, the
need for a physical model to validate the design certainly exists. Antenna acquisition or
construction is scheduled for September 1994, with mounting in November. December
should see the PARAMAX integrated into the ground station, whereupon the PANSAT
ground station will be completely functional, and then operational after testing by early
1995.
b. Amateur Ground Stations
The decision to pursue the PARAMAX design had significant impact on
the "Ham Kit" design. As the satellite design progresses it has become increasingly
apparent that a separate, simple design for amateur radio operators is not feasible. The
emphasis in this context is that the Ham Kit design is unlikely to be a separate one. The
amateur radio operator must have a ground station which is almost identical to the
command ground station in order to communicate with PANSAT. The principal
difference will be in the form of software, specifically, command and control capability and
security passwords that are only available to the command station. Whether or not an
amateur utilizes the PANSAT recommended ground antenna design may impact the link
viability. The reason the current design was selected was largely to minimize the
probability of large polarization losses. More popular antenna designs for amateur
satellite links suffer substantially greater polarization effects.
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A final but important consideration in the development of the "Ham Kit"
is adaptability. Specifically, the kit will be better received by the amateur radio community
if it can be readily expanded or modified for use with other satellites and or systems.
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III. SPACECRAFT TESTING
A group project completed in June 1994 for AA-4831, Spacecraft Systems II,
examined, in detail, the issues involved in spacecraft testing as it specifically related to the
PANSAT project. [Ref. 1 1 ] The author of this thesis was the project lead for that Test
Plan Development project. That project consisted of the background research and an
initial Test Plan framework specifically designed to the PANSAT project. The title for the
group's report of findings was "PANSAT Test Plan". Unless specifically noted or
otherwise referenced, the contents of this chapter will be drawn directly from the findings
of the aforementioned project.
This chapter will address testing terminology, environmental, functional and
operational testing issues and provide recommendations where feasible. This thesis is
primarily concerned with the future of the project; therefore, past and ongoing testing will
not be covered in this chapter.
A. TESTING OVERVIEW
1. Testing Terminology
Military Standard 1540B (MIL-STD-1540B) dated 10 October 1982 is very
specific as to the required tests for any government spacecraft. Testing requirements and
categories can be described in many ways, Environmental testing, Functional testing,
Qualification testing, Acceptance testing, Developmental testing, and Operational testing.
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It can be a daunting task in itself to organize a plan into logical categories and sequences.
For this thesis the testing is organized in the following manner. The broadest and
therefore, top level testing fall into one of three categories which describe the general goal
of the test: Environmental, Functional, or Operational. Within Environmental testing,
qualification or acceptance testing can be applied and will be used to determine testing
levels. Development testing can be generally considered to be a subcategory of functional
testing implying the design level at which the test occurs. Functional and Environmental
testing are roughly aimed at determining how a particular component, subsystem or
system conforms to specifications. Operational testing is aimed at evaluating how a whole
system, or possibly significant subsystem, performs its intended mission in a typical
operational environment.
a. Qualification Testing
Qualification test levels are usually specified as the design levels. These
test levels are established to exceed the range of environments and stresses expected in
any subsequent use. The expected environmental maximums are adjusted with a margin of
safety to establish design levels. For vibration testing, these margins must further ensure
that repeated acceptance, if necessary, will not jeopardize the integrity of the hardware.
Qualification tests should validate the planned acceptance test program, including test
techniques, test procedures, test environments, ground support test equipment, and
computer software.
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Qualification testing is associated with prototype equipment and as such
has a somewhat limited application to PANSAT. Prototype components and subsystems
should undergo normal qualification testing, but protoflight components should not be
exposed to the full qualification extremes. The adjustments to qualification of space flight
(protoflight) vehicle is as follows:
• Acoustic qualification shall be 3 dB above maximum predicted, but not less than 141
dB overall.
• Vibration levels shall produce vibration responses 3 dB greater than maximum
expected.
• Thermal Vacuum shall have 4 cycles of temperatures 5° C beyond maximum
expected.
• If optional thermal cycling is adopted as baseline, minimum temperature range of 60°
C should be used for minimum 15% more cycles than acceptance testing stipulates.
b. Acceptance Testing
Acceptance test levels are the maximum expected environmental levels.
This testing is generally associated with deliverable space flight equipment. Protoflight
equipment should be tested to the amended qualification levels described in the previous
section. Acceptance tests are intended to demonstrate the flight-worthiness of each
deliverable item. Acceptance tests should demonstrate acceptable performance over the
specified range of mission requirements.
c. Functional Testing
This required test verifies that the electronic, electrical and mechanical
performance of the component meets the requirements. Electrical tests shall include
application of expected voltages, impedance, frequencies, pulses, and waveforms at the
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electrical interfaces of the component, including all redundant circuits. These parameters
shall be varied throughout their specification ranges over the sequence expected in flight
operation, and the component output shall be measured to verify component performance.
A functional test shall be conducted prior to and after each of the environmental tests.
d. Component Development Tests
The major portions of the development test series are conducted on
breadboards and prototypes at the component and subassembly levels. The objective is
early verification of the critical design concepts to reduce the risk involved in committing
the design to qualification and flight hardware. Designs should be characterized across
worst case voltage, frequency, and temperature variations at breadboard level. Functional
testing in thermal and vibrational environments is normally conducted. For electronic
boxes, thermal mapping in a vacuum environment may be needed to verify the internal
component thermal analysis.
e. Component Qualification and Acceptance Tests
The space vehicle component qualification and acceptance test baseline
consist of all the required tests specified below. The test baseline shall be tailored for each
program. Each component that is acceptance tested as a component shall undergo
comparable qualification tests as a component. In certain circumstances, required
component qualification tests may be conducted partially or entirely at the subsystem or
space vehicle levels of assembly.
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/. Environmental Testing
Environmental testing is focused at determining a spacecraft's
performance in the environments to which it will be subjected either in transportation,
launch or operation. Vibration testing is aimed at vehicle transportation and launch.
Thermal testing is aimed at on-orbit operations, launch and deployment. Radiation testing
is aimed at the electromagnetic environments to which it will be exposed during
transportation, launch and operations as well as the s/c's own radiation characteristics.
Since a significant portion of this report is dedicated to development of environmental
testing issues in general and specifically applied to PANSAT, it will not be further
developed here.
2. Testing Philosophy
A testing philosophy is a logical approach to developing a coherent testing
sequence. With regard to available assets, the entire range of possible testing should be
delineated for consideration. The tests required by the Hitchhiker program should first be
developed. The remaining tests would then be listed and analyzed for applicability. Those
tests should be ranked in terms of their relative importance to PANSAT performance
enhancement. This precedence list can be analyzed for each particular tests' impact on
program cost and schedule. After this process, the remaining tests should be merged with
the Hitchhiker required testing and analyzed for potential combinable tests.
The PANSAT testing philosophy, therefore, is to test for design verification
and performance improvement while fullfilling Hitchhiker requirements. Test selection
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and sequencing should be determined via a logical process yielding those tests that are
the most worthwhile, not just the most do-able. The results of this testing sequence




PANSAT must be able to withstand the forces to which it will be subject
throughout its lifetime. It must withstand the vibrational and acoustic effects of the launch
vehicle. Additionally, the satellite will be exposed to the shock effects of engine ignition
and shutdown, as well as the shock caused by pyrotechnic separations, ejection from the
shuttle, and ground handling.
Vibration testing falls under the larger category of environmental testing.
Some of the qualification test methods that can be performed on a spacecraft before flight
qualification are: discrete force, below-resonant frequency sine dwell, sine burst vibration,
sine sweep, random vibration, and transient (shock) testing. These rigorous qualification
tests ensure that the space vehicle will survive its initial trip into space.
The random vibration environment imposed on the space vehicle components
is due to the lift-off acoustic field, aerodynamic excitations, and transmitted structure-
borne vibration. The maximum predicted random vibration environment is specified as a
power spectral density, based on a frequency resolution of 1/6 octave (or narrower)
bandwidth analysis, over a frequency range of 20 to 2000 Hz. A different spectrum may
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be required for different equipment zones or for different axes. The component vibration
levels are based on vibration response measurements made at the component attachment
points during ground acoustic tests or during flight. The duration of the maximum
environment is the total period during flight when the overall amplitude is within 6 dB of
the maximum overall amplitude. Where sufficient data are available, the maximum
predicted environment may be derived using parametric statistical methods. The data
must be tested to show a satisfactory fit to the assumed underlying distribution. The
maximum predicted environment is defined as equal to or greater than the value at the
ninety-fifth percentile value at least 50 percent of the time. Where there are less than
three data samples, a minimum margin of 3 dB is applied to the prediction to account for
the variability of the environment.
The sinusoidal vibration environment imposed on the space vehicle subsystems
and components is due to sinusoidal and narrow band random forcing functions within the
launch vehicle during flight, or from ground transportation and handling. In flight
sinusoidal excitations may be caused by unstable combustion, by coupling of structural
resonant frequencies with propellant system resonant frequencies (POGO), or by
imbalances in rotating equipment in the launch vehicle or space vehicle. Sinusoidal
excitations may occur during ground transportation and handling due to the resonant
response of tires and suspension systems of the transporter. The maximum predicted
sinusoidal vibration environment is specified over a frequency range of 20 to 2000 Hz for
flight excitation and 0.3 to 300 Hz for ground transportation excitation. Where sufficient
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data are available, the maximum predicted environment may be derived using parametric
statistical methods as described above. Where there are less than three data samples, a
minimum margin of 3 dB is applied to the prediction to account for the variability of the
environment.
The pyro shock environment is due to structural response when the space or
launch vehicle electro-explosive devices are activated. Resultant structural response
accelerations resemble the form of superimposed complex decaying sinusoids which decay
to a few percent of their maximums in 5 to 15 milliseconds. The Maximum Predicted
Pyro Shock Environment is specified as a maximum absolute shock response spectrum
determined by the response of a number of single-degree-of-freedom systems using Q =
10. The Q is the acceleration amplification factor at the resonant frequency for a lightly
damped system. This shock response spectrum is determined at frequency intervals of
one-sixth octave or less over a frequency range of 100 to 10,000 Hz. Where sufficient
data are available, the maximum predicted environment may be derived using parametric
statistical methods as described above. Where there are less than three data samples, a
minimum margin of 4.5 dB is applied to account for the variability of the environment [Ref
12:p. 64].
Pyro shock testing is not required for Hitchhiker payloads. In general, the high
frequencies (100 - 10,000 Hz) are easily damped out over distances of 5 inches or more.
The Hitchhiker payloads are sufficiently displaced from the pyrotechnic devices used to
release the GAS canister release bolts, Shuttle SRB's and external fuel tank.
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a. Requirements
Since PANSAT is less than 180 kg, vibration testing will be conducted in
lieu of acoustic testing. The vibration test requirements are delineated in the Customer
Accommodations and Requirements Specifications (CARS). Further details are specified
in the Shuttle Orbiter/Cargo Standard Interfaces document, the General Environmental
Verification Specification for STS Payloads, Subsystems, and Components manual.
(1) Equipment Integrity and Factors of Safety. Hitchhiker payloads
require structural testing to 1 .25 times the limit loads and positive margins of safety by
analysis at 1.4 times the limit loads for ultimate failure modes (fracture and buckling).
Analysis showing positive margins of safety at 2.0 times the limit loads and 2.6 times limit
loads for ultimate failure modes may alternatively qualify the payload for Hitchhiker
launch. [Ref 13:p.3-5]
(2) Vibration Frequency Constraints. Hitchhiker payloads are required
to have a lowest natural frequency of greater than or equal to 35 Hz, ideally greater than
50 Hz. Predicted natural frequencies below 100 Hz require modal survey or sine sweep
testing to verify, a recent analysis has a predicted natural frequency for PANSAT with
internal components at 67.26 Hz, so the sine sweep test will be required.
(3) Random Vibration Test. Random vibration testing exposes a
payload to the design level vibroacoustic environment. It is considered to be the most
realistic test to simulate many actual environments. The typical frequencies used to excite
the payload range from 20 to 2000 Hz. Due to the infinite number of frequencies within
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the above bandwidth, the 20-2000 Hz bandwidth is subdivided into narrower frequency
bands or lines. The smaller these new bands or "lines" are, the more in depth the testing.
The determining factors rest with the tester's preference and the capability of the
vibrational control system or shaker.
The energy focused on the payload at each of these frequencies will
have a pulse that is determined randomly from a gaussian distribution about the
determined test level. The amplitude level is limited to prevent failure and is specified in
g
2/Hz. Dividing by the filter bandwidth yields normalized data, allowing plots with two
different bandwidths to be directly compared.
When conducting random vibration qualification testing, the
component is mounted to a rigid fixture through the normal mounting points of the
component. It is critical that the mounting system be an accurate representation of the
actual system, and that the system be rigid. Failure to do so could result in tremendous
errors. Testing is done in each of three mutually perpendicular axes. The minimum
overall test level for components weighing less than 50 lbs is 12 g^ (root mean square).
Components weighing more than 50 lbs are evaluated on an individual basis. Test
duration time for each axis is determined by the greater of three times the expected flight
exposure time to the maximum predicted environment, three times the component random
vibration acceptance test time, or three minutes. New design equipment, such as
PANSAT, must be tested to qualification levels. Qualification Random Vibration levels
and spectrum are shown in Table 1
.
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TABLE 1: VIBROACOUSTIC QUALIFICATION LEVELS







(4) Sine Vibration Test. The sine vibration test is used to identify the
resonant frequencies. The lowest natural frequency must be equal to or greater than 35
Hz, and desirable to be above 50 Hz as stipulated in the Hitchhiker CARS. If the lowest
cantilevered natural frequency is predicted to be below 100 Hz, then the natural frequency
must be verified by either modal survey or sine sweep vibration.
Sine vibration testing exposes the payload to the design levels of
the sinusoidal (or decaying sinusoidal) vibration environment. The vibration element is
due to the sinusoidal and narrow band forcing functions of the launch craft during flight
and during ground transportation. The sinusoidal excitations during ground transport are
generated from the resonant responses from the transporter's tires and suspension. This
test is most useful when testing for environments that have dominant narrowband
frequency characteristics. Tests are conducted to see if the payload can not only
withstand but operate in this environment. Sinusoidal vibration testing also verifies the
natural frequency and determines if there are any resonant frequencies of the payload that
should be noted. Lastly, this test is used to evaluate fixtures used in the testing.
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The sine vibration test can be a sweep type test that sweeps across
a frequency band or a dwell type test which dwells on a specified frequency. Sine
vibration testing requires a minimum and maximum frequency, start frequency and
direction, number of sweeps, sweep rate, and an acceleration profile. A good test sweeps
the frequency band a number of times with changing sweep directions. Also, because the
starting frequency and direction are of no consequence, the test can be aborted and started
up again at the abort point.
Test levels are chosen to produce vibration responses equal to the
maximum predicted flight environment plus a design margin. Structural response at
resonant frequencies will be limited to prevent design limit loads from being exceeded.
Careful consideration shall be given to resonance effects of the structure, adapter type,
table control techniques, and location of control accelerometers. During the test, all
electrical and electronic components will be energized and sequenced through all
operational modes, unless operation would result in damage. Test duration for each axis
will be the greater of three times the expected exposure to maximum flight environment,
three times the acceptance test duration, or three minutes.
(5) Sine Burst Test. All launch loads for the Space Shuttle must be
able to withstand the launch, operational, reentry and landing environments of the Shuttle
without failure. The stated requirement is for structural resting at 1.25 times the limit
loads, with positive margins of safety by analysis of 1 .4 times the limit loads for all modes
of failure. Qualification by analysis alone can be done if positive margins of safety can be
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shown at 2.0 times the limit loads for material yield and 2.6 times the limit loads for
ultimate failure modes. This is to be approved on a case by case basis, however, by
GSFC. If analysis alone cannot qualify the spacecraft, a sine burst test or equivalent test
must be performed.
(6) Transient (Shock) Testing. Transient testing is used for simulating
short duration, high amplitude disturbances. Examples are impacts and stage separations
(which involve pyrotechnic devices). Waveforms used in transient testing can be broken
down into classical waveforms, shock spectrum synthesis, and field transients. Once again,
the Hitchhiker requirements, as stated in the CARS, make no mention of transient or
shock testing. More realistic vibrational tests have been developed which run two tests
concurrently (e.g., sine on random and transient on random). While not required, these
tests should be considered. If a later decision is made to launch PANSAT via means other
than the shuttle, a new test plan will have to developed.
b. Proposed Plan
(1) Sine Vibration Test Plan. This test is required, since the lowest
resonant frequency, based on analysis, is 67.26 Hz, [Ref 14:p.36] which is below the 100
Hz threshold for testing. The Sine Vibration Test consists of a low-level sinusoidal
excitation, which will be swept from 20 to 2000 Hz. The test will be conducted three
times, once in each axis for a duration of three minutes. This test will be used to identify
actual resonant frequencies
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(2) Random Vibration Test. This test will consist of excitation at
frequencies between 20 and 2000 Hz. Since it is not practicable to test at all frequencies,
a sampling of 1600 lines will be made. The energy level at each frequency is to be
controlled to a level determined by use of the power spectral density plot found in the
Hitchhiker Customer Accommodation and Requirements Specifications (CARS). The
actual amplitudes will be random. This test will be conducted in each of the three axes.
The shaker must be able to shake PANSAT with a force equal to the mass times the
acceleration of gravity. PANSAT is on the order of 150 lbs; adding ten lbs for the fixture
gives a total weight of 160 lbs. Therefore, the shaker must be capable of approximately
1280 lbs, based on a total weight of 160 lbs, and a Grms of 8. This precludes use of the
MB Dynamics PM 500A shaker, which is capable of only 465 lbs. On the other hand, the
Ling shaker is capable of up to 3000 lbs for sine sweep and shock testing, and 1500 lbs for
random vibration testing. Therefore, the Ling shaker can meet the requirements. The
Ling is capable of operations, but has not yet been qualified for use.
(3) Sine Burst Test. Presently, there is no plan to conduct any strength
testing based on the high margins of safety obtained in analysis. Table 2 [Ref. 14]
provides load vectors derived for a yield Factor of Safety of 1.25 and an ultimate Factor of
Safety of 1.5.
TABLE 2: STRUCTURAL STRENGTH ANALYSIS
Load Case Element # Max. Stress (dsi) Ave. Stress (dsi) Smallest M.S.
X(9 g's) 155 2.911 x 10 3 5.17 x 102 11.37
Y(9 g's) 144 2.911 x 103 5.17 x 10 2 11.37
XY(9g's) 145 3.005 x 103 4.99 x 102 10.98
Z(15g's) 379 4.884 x 103 1.414 x 10 3 6.37
Combined 379 4.884 x 10 3 1.777 x 10 3 6.37
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The smallest Margin of Safety (M.S.) is 6.37 (CARS requires only a
positive M.S.). Although the specified limit loads do not meet the CARS stipulated
Factor of Safety requirements of 2.0 times the limit loads for material yield and 2.6 times
the limit loads for ultimate failure, the large Margins of Safety more than cover the
reduced Factors of Safety. This analysis should be more than sufficient to satisfy strength
testing requirements, and should be submitted to GSFC for approval in lieu of structural
testing. [Ref 13:p. 3-5]
c. Unresolved Issues
MIL-STD 1540B stipulates that all electronics and electrical circuits be
energized during testing, even if they will not be operating during launch. Monitors
should be in place to detect failures as the electronics are sequenced through their
operational modes. The exception to this is for equipment which would definitely be
damaged by energizing during the test, but not in the operating environment. Presently,
there has been no plan to energize circuits during vibration testing. It is recommended
that this be changed to comply with the requirements of MIL-STD 1540B.
Because the structural analysis was conducted for factors of safety lower
than that required, it is recommended that another analysis be done at the higher factors of
safety to confirm positive margins of safety. While the high margins of safety appear to be
more than sufficient, the analysis does not meet the actual requirements. Further, this
waiver of strength testing based on analysis is currently on a case-by-case basis, the
groundwork for which should be pursued for clarification.
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Planned test duration for the different vibration tests is presently
scheduled for three minutes. If the MIL-STD 1 540B requirements are to be complied
with, the test duration must be the greater of three times the expected flight exposure time
to the maximum predicted environment, three times the acceptance test time, or three
minutes. Three minutes may in fact be sufficient, but there is no evidence that any
determination of flight exposure time has been made.
No plans for testing or analyzing the fixture for attaching PANSAT to
the vibration shaker have been developed yet, since the fixture has not yet been designed.
The present intent is to perform a modal analysis once a fixture has been designed and
manufactured. It is important to get the fixture "right," in order to avoid large errors in
vibration testing.
2. Thermal Testing
Spacecraft design consideration must be given to the temperature and pressure
extremes imposed by the space environment. Thermal testing is primarily designed to
evaluate component, subsystem and system performance in that environment. Internal
temperatures ranging from 0°C to +40°C are anticipated for PANSAT's orbit. This
estimate is based on separate steady stated and transient analyses that have been
performed for PANSAT.
Thermal Vacuum testing exposes the component, subsystem or system to the
predicted spacecraft environment. It is designed to evaluate the spacecraft's ability to
withstand the temperature and pressure extremes of space. Thermal Cycling testing is
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designed to evaluate a spacecraft's ability to withstand the stresses imposed by
temperature cycling imposed by orbit eclipses. Thermal Balance testing is designed to
verify the thermal model (analysis) and therefore the spacecraft's thermal control system's
ability to maintain s/c temperatures within acceptable limits.
a. Requirements
As is the case with other types of environmental testing, specific
Hitchhiker imposed thermal test requirements are delineated in the Shuttle Orbiter/Cargo
Standard Interfaces document and the General Environmental Verification Specification
for STS Payloads, Subsystems, and Components manual. The Hitchhiker stipulated
qualification level thermal testing requirements can be fulfilled by mathematical model
analysis. These are the only hard thermal testing requirements per se for PANSAT;
however, modified qualification level thermal cycling is a self imposed requirement for
design validation.
b. Proposed Plan
The current plan for thermal related testing consists of component,
subsystem and system level thermal vacuum and cycling tests. Thermal balance will be
conducted on a time permitting basis, although no efforts to this point have been made to
investigate the logistical implications of setting up a thermal balance test. Thermal
vacuum testing will be conducted from -10° C to +50° C. Note this is in excess of the +/-
5° level stipulated for protoflight level qualification.
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Cost and schedule requirements dictate the test vehicle will also be used
as the actual flight vehicle. MIL-STD-1540B mandates qualification test levels be
diminished in level of intensity and duration if the test vehicle and spacecraft are the same.
Additionally all component sub-assemblies tested in accordance with MIL-STD-1540B
must have passed the component acceptance test baseline.
Prior to commencing the sequence it is assumed component level testing
as certified by the production factory is valid, and that the assembly level tests will be
completed, which will also verify the test data. Thermal testing in particular will consist of
the thermal balance developmental test that serves to verify the thermal analysis and
modeling of the space vehicle and component thermal design criteria.
(1) Component Thermal Acceptance Tests. The spacecraft
components serve various purposes such as actuators, valves, batteries wiring harnesses
and individual black boxes (such as transmitters or multiplexes). MIL-STD- 1 540B allows
component acceptance test to be conducted at the subsystem level or space vehicle level
of assembly. However, in order to maintain fault traceability, documentation of individual
component level tests is required. Therefore component level testing should be conducted
at acceptance levels to include the baseline thermal vacuum and thermal cycling test. A
functional test will be conducted before and after each thermal test.
(2) Subsystem Thermal Acceptance Test. Subsystems are assemblies
of functionally related components that perform one or more prescribed functions.
Although not mandated by MIL-STD- 1540B, thermal vacuum and cycling testing should
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be conducted for deficiency or fault identification prior to assembly level tests. As with
other testing, the level of test is determined on a case by case basis if the subsystem is
flight equipment, prototype or protoflight.
(3) Space Vehicle Thermal Vacuum Qualification Test. This test
demonstrates the space vehicle's ability to meet the design requirements under vacuum
conditions and at temperature extremes which simulate those for flight plus design margin.
A space vehicle, modified qualification level test procedure is described below:
• Conduct functional test for the entire vehicle to establish operating baseline.
• Reduce chamber pressure to 10"6 torr and power up on-orbit systems once at the low
pressure level.
• Commence temperature cycle from ambient and reduce to the specified low
temperature and lower an additional 5° C.
• Soak at low for 8 hr but do not allow the system to fall below the design limit.
• Raise the temperature to the specified high temperature and soak for 8 hr.
• Conduct four complete cycles at the maximum predicted orbital rate and conduct
functional test after the last cycle.
(4) Thermal Balance Qualification Test. This test will verify the vehicle
thermal analytical model and demonstrates the ability of the thermal control systems ability
to maintain the vehicles specified operational temperature. Additionally this test verifies
the adequacy of component thermal design criteria. The goal of thermal Balance testing is
to match the vehicle thermal performance to +/-3° C of the predicted thermal
performance. In order to simplify the test protocol thermal balance testing should be
combined with thermal vacuum testing, if feasible.
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c. Unresolved Issues
Thermal testing philosophy, as with other environmental testing, is
geared towards fulfilling Hitchhiker requirements first, and secondly (but equally
important) to ensure successful on orbit operations. The accurate characterization of
temperature and altitude effects on PANSAT and its subsystems is critical to project
success.
The NPS spacecraft test facility consists of one operational thermal
vacuum tester that will accommodate component level testing only. Current plans call for
the complete renovation of an existing albeit inoperative chamber that can house the entire
craft for assembly level tests. Based on a preliminary search of an alternate facility and the
accompanying transportation and user fees it is believed the best option is continue current
plans to renovate the "large" chamber. This will give the added benefit of keeping all
production and test "in house".
The principal question with regard to thermal testing is the status of
system level testing that requires the large thermal vacuum facility in Halligan Hall. To
date the PANSAT team has ball park figures of renovation costs for that chamber, but no
funds securely in place to carry out the project. Adequate facilities are available at
various nearby locations such as China Lake Naval Weapons Center. The issues involved
in this possibility, however, have received no attention as of yet. Questions involved in
this option include safe transportation of the space vehicle (how, where & structural
stresses?), what exact facilities are available (i.e., no conflicting scheduling), what is the
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minimum desirable test sequence and how long would it take to complete, and how much
would this transportation and test cost (TDY funding, transportation costs, facility
charges, etc.)? The final issue in this vein is just how necessary is systems level thermal
testing, or what risk is incurred by not testing? The question can be reduced to a slightly
simpler one upon consideration of the costs of off-sight testing. An additional
consideration in this issue is the fact that funds spent to refurbish the Halligan chamber
will result in a product that can be used more than once. On the other hand, once an off-
sight test has been conducted, there will be no residual value to the investment Although
the off-sight costs not yet been detailed, it would have to be significantly cheaper to
warrant consideration unless time limitations forced this option. A trade study is
warranted toward this end; however, until such a study is conducted conclusively it is
recommended that all available avenues be pursued towards determining exact costs to
renovate and obtaining those moneys required to complete the project.
3. Electromagnetic Compatibility Testing
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) and Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)
Testing fall under the broader category of environmental testing. The three topical areas
of primary interest in reference to EMC testing are frequency management,
electromagnetic interference, and electromagnetic susceptibility. The general issues of
frequency management are frequency assignment and maintaining transmissions to within
the assigned frequency band. The assignment of transmission frequency of 436.5 MHz
puts PANSAT in an Amateur Radio Band and as such brings about FCC related
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restrictions [Ref. 15] on power and bandwidth management. Electromagnetic Interference
can be thought of as referring to electromagnetic emissions from PANSAT and their effect
on the Shuttle Orbited and other payloads. EMI is also an important consideration in the
design of internal subsystems and components to ensure avoiding adverse effects internal
to the s/c. Electromagnetic susceptibility refers to the adverse effects which PANSAT
may incur as a result of exposure to EM fields from environmental sources. This can refer
to internal cause and effects of various electromagnetic components.
Electromagnetic Compatibility can be described as the ability of electronic
equipment to operate in the intended operational environment without causing
unacceptable degradation to other equipment, and without receiving unacceptable
degradation from other equipment. [Ref. 16] Electromagnetic Interference is the
degradation which is caused when either of the above conditions is not achieved.
The DoD categorization of EMC criticality is useful and instructive for all
EMC applications, military or not. DoD describes three levels of EMC effects with
respect to their potential damage type and degree. [Ref. 16] Category I involves serious
injury or loss of life, damage to property or major loss or delay of mission capability.
Category II involves degradation of mission capability, including loss of autonomous
operational capability. Category III implies the loss of functions not essential to mission.
a. Requirements
PANSAT resides in a somewhat nebulous world with respect to
requirements. It is a military supported project but one that is not subject to the standard
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DoD requirements as are typical military space programs. The specific requirements that
PANSAT is responsible to design, test, and document to are outlined in the Shuttle Cargo
Standard Interface Control Document, ICD 2-19001, and the General Environmental
Verification Specifications for STS Payloads and Components Manual (GEVS).
Additionally PANSAT must meet further test requirements specifically for s/c which have
their own transmitter. These requirements are primarily at the subsystems/component
level and there is further requirement for a system's level test with all flight equipment in
accordance with MIL-STD 1540B. These requirements basically provide for certification
of non-interference of the payload with the Orbiter, and that the payload is not susceptible
to interference from known Orbiter EM radiation patterns. The remaining requirements
for PANSAT are self imposed. This is not to diminish the importance of the self imposed
requirements as they relate directly and immediately to mission performance.
PANSAT has a frequency allocation of 3 MHz bandwidth from 435-438
MHz (as do all 70 cm band satellite control earth stations). Transmission power is limited
to 611 Watts effective radiated power (1000 Watts EIRP). The 1/2 power point must
maintain a minimum elevation of 10° above the horizon. [Ref. 15] Due to the nature of
spread spectrum communications and PANSAT' s low power, the only requirement
requiring verification is likely to that of ensuring no power above noise outside of the
bandwidth allocation.
The final EMC related requirement is a safety verification report which is
detailed in the CPR and GEVS. This is part of an encompassing safety document required
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for STS payloads; the EMC portion deals with ensuring precautions to prevent radiation
harm to other payloads, the orbiter and crew. As of this writing, there is no formal plan
for PANSAT with regard to EMC testing.
EMI issues as applied to PANSAT fall into a variety of aspects all of
which bear design consideration and testing. EMC of components and subsystems that
make up the spacecraft is probably the most immediately applicable to PANSAT.
Interference between subsystems can degrade or prevent operation of the s/c. EM field
mapping of components will be conducted as construction progresses; this will also
include the characterization of the effects of external fields on components. The external
fields will be generated to simulate fields generated by other components and subsystems
as well as the operational and orbiter environment.
The primary issues involved with EMC testing are:
• Requirement certification in order to obtain flight qualification aboard from
Hitchhiker.
• Safety verification.
• Electromagnetic emissions control of components, subsystems and the system.
• Electromagnetic susceptibility control with respect to the orbiter environment.
In other words, EMC testing is all about ensuring no adverse effects on
or from the launch platform and ensuring proper operation of the system in general and its




Although PANSAT is not required to be tested to Military Standards, the
procedures and considerations in MIL-STD-461, 462 and 6051 are not overly restrictive
and should be followed unless it can be shown why a particular method is not reasonable
or feasible. Quite simply, the procedures outlined are sound and practical and following
them should enhance the reliability of PANSAT as well as provide a sound basis for
requirements verification when the exact requirements become available. MIL-STD-462
lists the equipment required for particular methods the majority of which is readily
available in the development lab.
The specific methods which are applicable to PANSAT components and
subsystems are (at a minimum):
CE03 Conducted Emissions, Power and interconnecting leads, .015 to 50 MHz
CE06 Conducted Emissions, Antenna terminals 10 kHz to 26 GHz
CE07 Conducted Emissions, Power leads, spikes, time domain
CSO
1
Conducted Susceptibility, Power leads, 30 Hz to 50 kHz
CS02 Conducted Susceptibility, Power and interconnecting control leads, .05 to
400 MHz
CS03 Intermodulation, 1 5 kHz to 10 GHz
CS04 Rejection of undesired signals 30 Hz to 20 GHz
CS05, Cross Modulation, 30 Hz to 20 GHz
CS06 Conducted Susceptibility, Spikes, power leads
CS07 Conducted Susceptibility, Squelch circuits
CS09 Conducted Susceptibility, Structure (Common Mode) Current 60 Hz to
100 kHz
CS10 Conducted Susceptibility, Damped Sinusoidal transients, Pins and
Terminals 10 kHz to 100 MHz
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CS1 1 Conducted Susceptibility, Damped Sinusoidal transients, Cables 10 kHz to
100 MHz
RE01 Radiated Emissions, Magnetic field, .03 to 50 kHz
RE02 Radiated Emissions, Electric field, 14 kHz to 10 GHz
RE03 Radiated Emissions, Spurious and harmonics, radiated technique
RS01 Radiated Susceptibility, Magnetic field, .03 to 50 kHz
RS02 Radiated Susceptibility, Magnetic and electric fields, spikes and power
frequencies
RS03 Radiated Susceptibility, Electric field, 1 4 kHz to 40 GHz
RS04 Radiated Susceptibility, Electromagnetic pulse field transient
System tests should be conducted to determine radiation patterns of the
spacecraft to characterize all modes as this information will be a required test for
Hitchhiker although permissible levels are not yet available. System EM susceptibility
testing should be conducted after a system functional baseline test has been performed
with a subsequent functional test following the susceptibility for evaluation purposes.
Susceptibility testing can be accomplished in the radio frequency shielded enclosure
simulating orbiter environmental characteristics. Radiation pattern characterization can be
conducted in the ECE antenna lab for the full transmit mode and in the radio frequency
shielded enclosure for idle/receive states.
c. Unresolved Issues
The principal issue yet to be resolved as detailed above is that of specific
requirements determination. What are the exact deliverable requirements and associated
timelines required for flight? A specific engineering plan for which of the above methods
will be tested to and how to do that most efficiently so as not to duplicate unnecessarily.
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The Shuttle Standard Cargo Interface Control Document, ICD 2-19001, was received in
June 1994, as a direct result of inquiries arising during the AA-4831 project. That
document is extremely large and will take considerable time for thorough review. Once all
pertinent requirements documentation is obtained, the subsystem managers should
familiarize themselves with all references in order to ensure compliance with any EMC
issues.
C. FUNCTIONAL TESTING
1. Functional Testing Issues
Functional tests primarily serve three purposes. [Ref. 12:p. 30] The first is to
verify that the mechanical and electrical performance of the space vehicle meet
specification requirements. The second purpose is to verify that the space vehicle and all
ground support equipment are fully compatible. Finally, the functional test validates all
test techniques, as well as the software algorithms used in any computer-assisted
command and data processing.
The basis for functional testing is the space vehicle functional requirements
document. This document specifies the purpose (mission) of the vehicle, functional
requirements for the components, subsystems, and space vehicle, and the acceptable
performance limits. For PANSAT, these specifications can be found in the Functional
Requirements (SSD-S-SY000) document.
The Mechanical Functional Test is designed to verify proper operation of all
mechanical devices, valves, deployables, and separable entities. This test is to be
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conducted in the appropriate space vehicle configuration (launch, orbital, or recovery) for
the tested component. Maximum and minimum limits of acceptable performance shall be
determined with respect to mechanics, time, and other applicable requirements. Each
mechanical operation will show positive margins of strength and torque margins.
Additionally, the test shall demonstrate the ability of the components to operate in
environments above and below specified operational limits.
The Electrical Functional Test is designed to verify the integrity of all electrical
circuits, including redundant paths, by application of a stimulus and confirmation of a
proper response. All commands are to be tested. This includes proper operation of
thermally controlled components, commands requiring preconditioning conditions, and
autonomously controlled functions. Additionally, a segment of this test shall be devoted
to testing the space vehicle through a mission profile with all events occurring in the actual
flight sequence as much as practicable. [Ref 12:p. 31]
2. Component and Subsystem Level Testing
The Hitchhiker Customer Accommodations & Requirements Specifications
document does not specify requirements for functional testing. The two primary reference
documents for functional testing requirements are the MIL-STD- 1 540B and the PANSAT
Functional Requirements document.
Since PANSAT does not have solar array arms, a stabilization system,
propulsion, or separable parts, there are no requirements for mechanical testing of these
types of space vehicle components. Space vehicle mechanical testing, outside of
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environmental testing, is limited to verification of outer dimensions (to ensure fitting inside
the Hitchhiker container), and compliance with the mechanical interface requirements.
Mechanical testing of the ground station will be required to assess antenna pointing
capability.
PANSAT systems to be electrically tested include the Communications,
Telemetry & Telecommand, Command Ground Station, Electrical Power, Thermal, and
Digital Control subsystems. While few of these systems have been built, the Functional
Requirements document provides design specifications around which a test plan can be
built.
In addition to the above test areas, testing to ensure proper compatibility
between satellite and GSE, as well as software controlled functions, is a necessary part of
the functional testing requirements. The following test requirements are derived from the
PANSAT Functional Requirements document.
a. Communications Subsystem
The communications payload is a simplex, spread spectrum system
operating in the amateur 70 cm band. It is the only means of communicating with the
satellite. The communications payload utilizes a fully redundant design system capable of
both spread spectrum and narrow band BPSK modulation on each unit. This payload will
be processor-controlled by the DCS. Data will be synchronous, with one pseudo-noise
(PN) code sequence length per bit of data. Specifications to be tested include:
• 9600 bps data rate, simplex




• mutually exclusive redundant SS modems
• capability to switch to (unspread) BPSK
• omni-directional antennas, no greater than 10 dB nulls
• antenna noise temperature not greater than 290°
b. Telemetry & Telecommand
Satellite telemetry consists of required data points from sensors and
vehicle operations that indicate performance of components and subsystems.
Telecommands consist of those commands that relate to implementation of the store-and-
forward capability and to the payload. Specifications to be tested include:
error detection and correction (BER TBD)
ability to switch to non-spread spectrum operation
near real-time buffered telemetry data updated ( 1 cycle)
periodic down-link of near real-time buffered telemetry
telemetry format and data-types capable of changes via DCS and up-link
stored telemetry for time history mail storage
spacecraft telemetry & experiment data collected from subsystems and stored
most recent TLM packet available for down-link
accumulated TLM data stored in system mail memory
capability to change frequency of telemetry data acquisition
proper operation of various sensors
c. Command Ground Station
This system is to utilize PC-based data handling and requires testing of
the following functions:
• software controlled Doppler compensation
• telemetry & telecommand up-link normal and contingency operation
• antenna elevation angle 1/2 power point not less than 10° above horizon
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maximum effective radiated power of 61 1 W (1000 W EIRP)
record and document all SS transmissions
antenna pointing functions within azimuth, and elevation required accuracy limits
error detection and correction (BER TBD)
receive and store raw telemetry
process telemetry for temp, profiles and distribution
process telemetry for power usage profiles by subsystem
process telemetry for payload usage and performance profiles
process telemetry for state of health data
d. Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS)
The EPS must properly regulate and distribute the electrical power
needed by the PANSAT subsystems. Specific requirements to be tested include:
21.5 Watts at 15.2 Vdc (avg-min pwr, solar array at end of life)
minimum subsystem efficiency of 60% power conditioning
bus regulated at 12 Volts
on-orbit battery reconditioning
positive power margin
10% depth of discharge (DOD)
5 Amp-hr capacity
sufficient power to meet specified power budgets
controller/sw accept code and data changes via up-link
e. Thermal Subsystem
To ensure proper thermal control, the following temperature
requirements for military specification parts are specified:
• MIL-STD-833 ICs within -55° to 1 25° C
• batteries 0° to 10° C nominal, -6° to 26° operational
• no more than five 5 W heaters at 10% duty cycle (per orbit)
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/. Digital Control System (DCS)
The DCS is responsible for processing digital messages, managing the
message buffer, maintaining an operational status log, and maintaining proper spacecraft
operation. It must accept up-linked messages (source-to-destination, source-to-broadcast,
and user-to-spacecraft), store them with associated information (source, destination, time
of receipt), and down-link them to the appropriate destination. Specifications are as
follows:
proper message and data handling:
communicates utilizing AX.25 protocol
store packet data (memory address, size, header)
logs record of transmissions
manages message buffer
four megabytes of dedicated data storage
accept code and data changes via up-link
NPS command station priority works
watchdog timer causes proper switch to non-SS modem
maintain satellite housekeeping
generates and formats status messages
updates latest telemetry data for down-link
stores all telemetry data
performs data bus control functions (polling subsystem controllers)
monitors subsystems, detects faults and initiates
recovery (reset or activate redundant unit)
processes telecommand functions/routines
stores daily passwords (recognizes and processes)
battery backup functions (microprocessor, RAM, clock)
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3. System Level Testing
The transition from subsystem to system level testing should be accomplished
incrementally. A series of multi-subsystem tests should be performed to allow
troubleshooting and fault isolation. The general design of the initial tests should be based
on functional relationships rather than strict subsystem boundaries.
a. Command Ground Station Support Test
The functional performance of the Command Ground station should be
tested initially during the development simply by communication with currently orbiting
amateur satellites. An accurate assessment of all parts of the ground station except for
that portion of the communication payload which is unique to PANSAT should be firmly
in place prior to the payload incorporation.
b. Payload Test
A payload test will utilize actual transmissions of test messages between
the s/c and ground station. Test messages will require PANSAT to receive, store, and
retransmit data to verify all functions, at or above the required 10" BER.
Communications will be established via cable or by RF antenna (during the later stages of
functional testing). Signal strength of the transmitted signal will be varied to simulate
tumbling of the satellite. Once communications are established with the satellite, a series
of command functions will be exercised to test data exchange, storage, and down-link.
The payload will be exercised in primary and secondary modes of operation. Input signal
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level should be varied to evaluate thresholds at which the s/c (and ground station) can no
longer perform at the specified BER.
c. Modes and Status Test
This test is primarily aimed at verifying proper functioning of the EPS
and DCS subsystems and their interrelationships. The test, in general, evaluates how the
subsystems perform at the boundary conditions imposed by specifications. Typical issues
for investigation by this test sequence are:
• Do the power generation and storage capability of the EPS perform as specified and
is the properly conditioned power available to customer components/subsystems?
• Does the DCS accurately evaluate the EPS (and overall s/c) status and accurately
transition the s/c into the required operational modes at the proper battery power
levels?
• Do the reported telemetry points accurately reflect their environment?
d. Overall System Test
The final step in this process is to combine the above test sequences in
order to verify the proper functioning of all elements of the system as they will operate
during operations. As previously mentioned, the final functional check should include an
RF vice cable link.
4. Unresolved Issues
Test equipment requirements need to be identified now, before subsystems are
completed. Hardware may not be available or sufficient. There is concern over acquiring
use of sufficiently large thermal vacuum chamber to test the assembled satellite. Another
related concern is that while computer support systems are probably sufficient, the issue of
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available testing software needs to be addressed. Present functional test planning does not
address testing of the ground station antenna. The EC department should be queried for
availability and suitability of antenna test equipment. The EPS test does not address
testing of the controller and associated software for acceptance of code and data changes
via up-link. Only the message and data handling functions of the DCS are addressed. The
functions of NPS command station priority, watchdog timer (switch to non-SS modem),
battery backup, and housekeeping are overlooked. These functions are vitally important
to satellite operations and need to be tested. An overall functional test plan has not been
laid out as a coherent sequence. It may be possible to test multiple subsystems
simultaneously, if enough sensors and test equipment are available.
D. OPERATIONAL TESTING
1. Operational Testing Issues
Operational Testing will be conducted to determine the effectiveness and
suitability of the PANSAT system. Operational testing should focus on the performance
of a system under typical conditions with typical users. Operational effectiveness is the
degree of mission accomplishment of a system under realistic conditions. Operational
suitability is the degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed in normal
operations, with respect to availability, reliability, maintainability, etc. Operational testing
should be conducted as early as possible via simulations, breadboards, components or
subsystems in smaller scale tests using the same approach. This should reduce project risk
by the early identification or potential problem areas.
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An effective operational test and evaluation plan addresses the issues of
operational effectiveness, (e.g., Does it perform as intended?) and operational suitability
(e.g., Is it satisfactory for field use?). Under the broad category of suitability, the
questions of reliability, availability, maintainability, supportability and other 'ilities' need to
be specifically addressed. As a part of the overall test and evaluation program, the
operational testing portion should take on increasing importance as the system design
solidifies and the program progresses from pre-production to production to deployment.
Operational testing performed before production can be referred to as
Operational Assessments or as Initial Operational Test and Evaluation. [Ref. 16] This
stage of test can be conducted on components or subsystems or only by simulation models
depending on the progress of development. The emphasis at this point should be on
determining the ability of the overall system to adequately perform in its intended role. It
cannot be overemphasized that operational testing, especially at this stage should be
designed with these guidelines rather than test for performance against technical
specifications, i.e., duplicating development testing.
Testing that occurs after full production can be referred to as Follow-on
Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E). The emphasis of FOT&E is the same as in
earlier stages, now, however it is more likely for the entire system to be used in the testing
rather than a combination of subsystems and simulations. This may be the first
opportunity to actually test the system in a realistic environment with representative users.
One caution that holds throughout operational testing, is that tests should be designed to
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generate data corresponding to carefully chosen Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) to
better assist decision makers in evaluating the system and to perform trade off analysis. A
common mistake is to gear tests towards the generation of easy to get and interpret data,
(which may have little or no relationship to MOE's). Such tests are wasteful and need
never have been performed.
DoD spacecraft testing generally is pursued along the same lines as the
previously described testing methodology. Spacecraft by nature pose some unique
problems which require special and specific addressal. The high cost of space system
generally imposes the limitation of very small production numbers. Spacecraft systems are
generally unique in many areas of design from any other spacecraft (except the relatively
rare, identical spacecraft) Testing spacecraft in a realistic environment is generally
physically impossible except for simulations until deployment. Last and most importantly,
any opportunity for system modification is lost after deployment (and therefore before a
full operational test), except for the ability to make relatively minor modification that has
been built into the spacecraft, e.g., sensor adjustment, software uploads, etc. With these
limitations in mind a generic spacecraft operational testing program simply does not exist.
Testing programs have to be developed alongside the spacecraft with care towards the
general principles outlined earlier, and with regard to some of the following
considerations.
PANSAT's Operational Testing program currently consists of the "On-Orbit
Operations Test Plan," a document in its infancy. Operational testing of PANSAT is
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relatively simple in concept. Operational testing plans should be gearing towards
evaluation and verification of data and command transmissions. Considerations include,
the communication link budget, the power budget, antenna characteristics, transceiver
capabilities, ground station configurations and an amateur radio operator. Spacecraft
responses to all possible commands and transmission errors must be evaluated for state
determination. As previously noted, a major concern with spacecraft is state and or mode
control. There must be sufficient consideration and testing to preclude the attainment of
permanent undesirable states due to command, control or data transmission. Software
testing is also a critical issue along those lines.
2. Operational Test Design











Based on this outline, the current document serves better as a framework for
an operations plan than as a test plan. This is not necessarily a problem, however; the
document should be developed as far as current design allows and from this detailed
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document, the test plan will be designed. The initialization sequence, communication
session, and experiment description sections are the principal topics that will developed
into an On-Orbit Operations test plan.
What has heretofore scarcely been addressed is how to conduct operational
test on PANSAT prior to launch. To a limited extent, operational testing will be satisfied
by slight modifications of (primarily) the systems level functional testing. To adequately
complete operational testing prior to flight, it will be necessary to make extensive use of
computer simulations of operations. Some of the typical operations that warrant testing
via simulation will be described in the following sections.
a. Attitude Dynamics
Develop initial and increasingly detailed and accurate estimations of
attitude dynamics based on the following:
• Detailed designs of PANSAT, with respect to component/subsystem location,
physical characteristics, wiring , etc.
• Atmospheric drag, solar pressure and other external torques
• Any internal torques
These inputs should lead to approximate principal and secondary axes,
Moments of Intertia (MOI), and thereby characteristics of attitude dynamics, or motion.
This quantification of the general descriptive term for PANSAT's orbit "tumbling" is an
important critical first step in the development offollow on tests.
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b. Power Generation, Storage and Consumption
Attitude dynamics will then be combined with the environmental
characteristics of the anticipated orbit to develop an improved model of power generation.
Current efforts at developing a power budget have taken nominal conditions into account
for power generation. This information, with component consumption characteristics,
leads directly to an EPS storage and consumption model to better predict s/c operational
performance. Operational performance here refers to how long the s/c can maintain
specific states or operational modes.
c. Initialization Sequence
Once it can be accurately predicted what the capabilities of the s/c are to
generate power, the initialization sequence can then be modeled. Various initial battery
conditions, and environments will be inputs to the model which will predict time from
launch (launch vehicle separation) until minimum power for communication is achieved.
In other words, this is the best prediction, when combined with PANSAT's orbital
elements, when the ground station will achieve communications with the s/c.
d. Operations Model
The above sequence of tests leads to the culmination of operational
testing, which incorporates the functional test design given earlier. PANSAT is
anticipated to have a negative power margin at worst and a very low margin power budget
at best. The anticipated range is aproximately -20% to +21%, depending largely on the
particular location of the baseplate with respect to the solar incidence angle. The model
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achieved through the above described process should reduce the margin of error in the
estimation and therefore lead allow the opportunity for operational decisions to
compensate for design weaknesses. Once a thorough EPS model, and therefore a highly
accurate power margin, is available, scenarios can be developed for the state adjustment of
the s/c to reduce the opportunity for (low) power induced problems. If PANSAT is below
a specified power capacity the s/c lowers its operational status until that capacity is
achieved. Similarly, if PANSAT is in a negative power budget orientation, lower the
operational status of the s/c when it is not in a likely communication window. The s/c
should be in its minimum power consumption state while not within a predetermined time
of likely communications. Operate when approaching the continental United States, for
example, and other land masses as the budget allows, but not over open ocean. Granted
this limitation may exclude a few desiring users, but the only overriding operational
concern is proof of concept. There is no significant necessity to provide other the than
minimum service to certify proof of concept.
E. TESTING SEQUENCE
1. General Test Flow
The testing program for a spacecraft should begin in the earliest stages of
design conception. Making "testability" a functional requirement early on sets the stage
for a program that is readily able to evaluate status in any phase of development. The
initial testing of most programs is developmental and functional in nature of components
at the breadboard and prototype levels. The primary objective is early verification of
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critical design concepts. Early detection of critical design shortcomings provides the
obvious benefit of correction at the easiest and least expensive level in terms of both cost
and schedule. As testing progresses to the acceptance and qualification phases, the goals
expand to that of a functional and environmental evaluation of the components,
subsystems, or system. The standard sequence of a typical qualification test battery is: a
comprehensive functional baseline test; EMC test: pressure; pyro shock; vibration;
acoustic; thermal cycling; thermal balance; thermal vacuum; and a post sequence
comprehensive baseline comparison functional test. Electrical and mechanical functional
testing should be conducted prior to and after each environmental test, as well as during
thermal and vibration testing. Some of the above requirements may be omitted as specific
program requirements dictate.
2. PANSAT Test Flow
The flow of PANSAT testing should be basically along the lines of the typical
spacecraft. Developmental testing of components and subassemblies to validate design
decisions, followed by the above sequence of functional environmental, with the following
omissions. Sine and Random vibration testing will be conducted in lieu of acoustic
testing. Thermal testing will consist of thermal cycling and thermal vacuum testing. No
efforts have been made to date to prepare for thermal balance due to the lack of available
facilities. Figure 8 shows the general flow of a testing sequence. This is shown for a
systems level test; however, the same flow can easily be applied at component,





































Figure 8: Test Sequence and Flow
Table 3 presents a brief summary of the proposed overall test plan. Thermal
testing requirements can be satisfied by mathematical analysis but are still strongly
recommended. Systems level thermal testing requires rehabilitation of an NPS facility.
Thermal Balance testing has not been examined but should be pursued time permitting.
EMC/EMI requirements can be satisfied at the systems level and are related to safety and
launch vehicle interference and compatibility. Subsystem and component level testing is
recommended for reliability purposes.
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF PROPOSED TESTING
Test Tvpe Required * Recommended Notes
Vibration Yes Qualification
Strength (sine burst) Yes ** Requires waiver to use analysis
Sine sweep Yes Verify natural frequency (> 35 Hz)
Random vibration Yes Realistic environmental simulation
Thermal vacuum No Yes System/Subsystem/Component level
Thermal cycling No Yes System/Subsystem/Component level
Thermal balance No Yes System level
EMC/EMI Yes Yes System/Subsystem/Component level
Functional Yes System/Subsystem/Component level
Operational Yes System/Subsystems level
* All requirements are NASA/Hitchhiker imposed.




The design and development of spacecraft operations, to this point in PANSAT's
development, have largely been glossed over. There have been only two Space Systems
Operations related theses completed on PANSAT to date, neither or which was more than
generally related to specific operations analysis issues for the current design status of
PANSAT. The emphasis of research with respect to this thesis was in the area of orbit
design. Timing priorities of the upcoming Customer Payload Requirements Document
dictated that this was an issue of more pressing concern than many other operational
issues. With respect to other aspects of operations, research was limited to developing
and prioritizing future areas of research. Pre-launch operations efforts in the short term
should be lumped together under the general umbrella of an "Operations Plan", which
should be a high priority. There are several inherent difficulties in developing an
Operations Plan. Defining the scope of an operations plan is the first obstacle, not only in
terms of what it should cover, but in what detail. Another stopping block, which has been
highlighted as a lesson learned in previous research, [Ref. 11] is the difficulty in
maintaining sight of the larger overall goal without becoming engulfed by details. The
PANSAT team has little experience in this type of undertaking and the same certainly
applies to the students involved to an even larger extent. When defining the contents of an
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operational plan, the tendency will be to overdevelop those issues that are well understood
and simultaneously lose sight of the more urgent need simply to first scope the effort for
completeness.
B. PROGRAMMATICS
With the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in April 1994, the
iterative process of developing and finalizing the Customer Payload Requirements (CPR)
document formally began. The purpose of the MOA was to define the relationships
between the USAF Space and Missile Center/Space Test and Small Launch Vehicle
Programs Office (SMC/CUL) and NPS on the terms and conditions for integration and
flight of PANSAT on the Space Shuttle. [Ref 18:p. 1]
The relationship between SMC/CUL and NASA is that NASA/Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC) is directly responsible for the overall Hitchhiker program.
SMC/CUL is responsible to GSFC for the integration of experiments and or payloads into
the Hitchhiker carrier for transportation onboard the Space Shuttle. The MOA delineates
the relationships and responsibilities between customers (NPS for PANSAT) and the
agency that transforms a payload into acceptable form for shuttle flight. The MOA
initiates the process of the Customer Payload Requirements document that is an
agreement between GSFC and the Hitchhiker customer to carry the customer's
experiment onboard the shuttle via Hitchhiker. The CPR is a technically specific
document formalizing the mutual responsibilities of carrying out that process. The end
89
result of the iterative CPR process is ideally, a manifested experiment, which is then
carried and launched from the Space Shuttle.
The implications of these two documents are significant to the PANSAT program in
many ways over and above the obvious ones detailed above. As will be explored in much
greater detail in Chapter V, the MOA to some extent and the CPR to a much larger extent
effectively eliminate the viability of (significant) program delays for re-design, or
cancellation as overall program management options.
C. ORBITAL DESIGN
If PANSAT were to obtain a dedicated launch vehicle and thereby become a primary
payload, the strong likelihood exists of being able to achieve a near optimum orbit for
mission employment. Orbital design could be pursued to the maximum capabilities of the
launch vehicle. Notwithstanding the tremendous advantages offered by alternative launch
options for PANSAT, the window of opportunity for utilizing launch vehicles other than
the Space Shuttle has come and gone. The orbit problem then transitions from designing
the optimum orbit to a series of simpler yet more difficult questions. The questions can be
seen as more difficult simply by the fact that regardless of all else, the orbit for PANSAT
is basically subject to the orbit of the Shuttle Mission on which it is flown.
The questions that need to be asked in order to perform an orbital analysis for
PANSAT are as follows:
• What orbits are available to the launch platform (Shuttle)?
• What is the expected and or desired time frame of launch for PANSAT?
• What are the Shuttle Missions scheduled during PANSAT' s launch window?
• What are the orbital parameters for the above Missions?
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• What effect do the orbital parameters have on the mission performance of
PANSAT?
• Is (are) there a preferred orbit(s) for PANSAT with regard to mission performance?
• How does PANSAT get on a mission to a preferred orbit?
For the purposes of this study, it was determined to proceed in the following manner. The
process of orbital determination is a multi-step procedure that is designed to select an
orbit which, while not optimal, is acceptable by those measures against which it will be
judged. The initial task was to narrow the choices of possible orbits. After narrowing the
possibilities, the task comes to measuring performance. The principle performance
measures considered for this study were duration and frequency of visibility windows and
orbital lifetime. Considered together, these factors present an excellent first cut at total
lifetime communication opportunity, an easily justifiable measure of effectiveness for
comparing satellite communication systems.
It should be noted again that the intent of the study was not to specify to a particular
level of accuracy what those numbers would be, but simply to provide a basis for relative
comparison. Obviously, the selection of the best candidate should not be made without
due consideration of many other factors. The effect of altitude (ergo range and free space
path loss) on PANSAT's link budget, qualitative examination of other aspects of passes,
and the feasibility of being manifested on the preferred mission are some examples.
The most challenging step of the process was to analyze the performance data.
Unless every performance measure pointed to a unique solution it would be necessary to
determine a method for comparing results from different performance measures against
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each other. There are several Operations Research techniques available to do this, such as
an Analytical Hierarchy Process, but these methods are basically heuristic approaches to
quantify subjectivity. In any event these processes do not lend themselves particularly well
in this scenario, with so many factors that cannot be quantified for numerical evaluation
against several purely numerical measures. In the final result, extraneous factors were
considered predominantly in the role of tie breakers.
1. Launch Platform Analysis
Since it is now obvious that the launch platform options have reduced to the
Space Shuttle, or not flying at all, the process of launch platform analysis is somewhat
simplified. The orbital capability of the Space Shuttle is most easily characterized simply
with regard to altitude. The published maximum shuttle operational altitude is 400
nautical miles (740 Km). The maximum altitude is associated with flights only at 28.5°
inclination. Orbital mechanics dictates that fuel required for inclination adjustment would
decrease altitude capabilities of the Shuttle. Since the Shuttle orbits rarely approach the
maximum operational altitude, the typical mission altitude of the shuttle cannot generally
be considered to be affected by orbital inclination adjustments. PANSAT' s development
schedule targets a deliverable spacecraft by March 1996. The incorporation of a standard
six months for payload integration places the initial launch window for PANSAT in the
September 1996 time frame [Ref 18:p. 5]. This launch time frame is therefore an excellent
point of origination for the examination of candidate Shuttle orbits. Table 4 [Ref. 19]
shows Shuttle missions 81 through 91 along with their scheduled launch dates, inclination
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and altitude. The parameter of altitude in Table 4 (and throughout the chapter) is, more
precisely, semi-major axis minus average equatorial earth radius, given an orbit of zero
eccentricity, i.e., perfectly circular. Since the missions considered typically have
eccentricities on the order of 10
5
this substitution has negligible effect on accuracy and
altitude is a much more concise term.




STS-81 MIR-5 9/6/96 397km 51.6
STS-82 MIR-6 11/7/96 397km 51.6
STS-83 SPACEHAB 12/5/96 295km 28.5
STS-84 MIR-7 1/30/97 397km 51.6
STS-85 HUBBLE SVC 2 3/27/97 600km 28.5
STS-86 MIR-8 4/17/97 397km 51.6
STS-87 MTL SCI 5/30/97 350km 28.5
STS-88 MIR-9 6/26/97 397km 51.6
STS-89 H-GRAVITY 7/31/97 400km 28.5
STS-90 MIR- 10 10/2/97 397km 51.6
STS-91 SSF #1 12/4/97 407km 28.5
Table 4, therefore addresses the first four above steps in an orbital analysis for
PANSAT, leaving an examination of how the candidate orbital parameters affect
PANSAT' s mission performance as the next logical step.
2. Principle Parameter Analysis
Based on evaluation of the data shown in Table 4, orbital analysis was
performed on four candidate orbits. Parameters for the four orbits were selected based on
the initial knowledge that higher altitude leads to both longer orbital lifetime and longer
times in view or pass times, a need to compare the effect of changing inclination (given
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equal altitudes) on pass opportunities, and the need to compare the effect of a significant
altitude change (given equal inclinations). This would lead to a group of orbits that would
allow reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the data gathered. Based on these
selection criteria, the orbits selected were a typical Mir, (Soviet Space Station) orbit, a
projected orbit for Space Station Alpha (SSA), the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) orbit,
and a typical Space Shuttle orbit.
The altitude selected for the Mir was 370 km. This number is intentionally
conservative but may be closer to an actual PANSAT orbit than that of Mir itself when
deconfliction is considered. Deconfliction here, means that PANSAT would not be put
into an orbit with any possibility of close passes to Mir. Mir has a typical eccentricity of
6xl0"
4
and is in a 51.6° inclination orbit6 .
Space Station Alpha has been tentatively planned for a 28.5° inclination and
407 km altitude. Eccentricity was assumed to be approximately zero and assigned the
same value as that of Mir.
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) has inclination of 28.5, an eccentricity of
less than 5x1
0~4
and altitudes of approximately 600 km. This altitude is significantly above
a typical STS mission and the first repair mission was done when HST was at an altitude
of 585 km. A conservative 570 km was used for the simulation altitude.
A fourth candidate orbit was analyzed. Called a 'generic' Shuttle orbit, the
orbit had an inclination of 28.5 and an altitude of 370 km specifically to compare the
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effects of inclination change on communication parameters against the Mir orbit, and to
compare the effects of increased altitude against the SSF and HST orbits.
The software program TRAKSAT7 was used as the principle analysis tool.
TRAKSAT was selected primarily because of an analytical orbit evaluation mode it
employs which enables the relatively rapid accumulation of large amounts of data for
evaluation. The analytical mode basically predicts rise and set time of satellites versus a
ground station. The controlling equation in the analytic mode is more difficult to solve but
is required only once per orbit, rather than a typical Keplerian step by step orbital
progression. The resulting benefit of the analytical mode is a tremendous increase in
speed. A small accuracy loss (less than one minute error in rise/set time) is a small price
to pay [Ref. 20].
The software program LIFE4, Version 1 .0, was used as an estimator of orbital
lifetime. Separate orbital lifetime prediction was being pursued by LT Dan Cuff in much
more detail, [Ref 19] so the lifetime prediction part of this analysis was pursued not for
exacting accuracy of numerous variables (e.g., solar cycle, magnetic field variations,
launch dates, etc.), but for a general comparison of how altitude and inclination differences
affect the lifetime taken one parameter change at a time. In this manner for both
TRAKSAT and LIFE4 simulations, tradeoffs and comparisons were made possible.
TRAKSAT pass data and statistics were gathered from a simulation run
covering a two week period from 7-16 September 1994 to approximate a possible mission
7TRAKSAT, Version three is a general purpose satellite tracking program distributed as shareware by Paul E.
Traufler, AEROSPACE Corporation.
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launch window. The four candidate satellite orbits were run against an NPS located
ground sight which had a minimum useable elevation of 10°. The data was analyzed for
average pass times, standard deviation of passes, and total number of passes for each
satellite. LIFE4 simulations were also run to determine lifetime predictions based on a
launch at the above date for each candidate orbit.
3. Comparisons
Table 5 summarizes the parameters of the four candidate orbits in the study.
The eccentricity for all candidates was assumed to be near zero for approximate circular
orbits but the programs required a non-zero value for input. The particular values of Mir
and Hubble Space telescope's eccentricities were based on recent NASA generated two-
line orbital element sets. The generic Shuttle and Space Station Freedom eccentricities
were assigned to match Mir for comparison purposes.
TABLE 5: CANDIDATE ORBIT PARAMETERS
CANDIDATE ORBIT ALTITUDE INCLINATION ECCENTRICITY
MIR TYPE 370km i = 51.6° 2x 10"4
GENERIC SHUTTLE 370km i = 28.5° 2x 10"4
HUBBLE SVC 600km i = 28.5° 6x 10 4
SPACE STATION
ALPHA
407km i = 28.5° 2x 10"4
Table 6 shows the calculated pass statistics for the candidate orbits. The
average duration of passes shows little significant difference for the orbits of similar
altitudes. In fact, the 38% change in altitude from Mir to HST orbits, yields only a 26%
increase in average pass duration. When standard deviations are considered, there is
effectively no identifiable difference in pass durations for co-altitude orbits with differing
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inclinations, and no difference in co-inclination orbits with an altitude difference of 37 km.
In short, with regard to pass duration (i.e., time in view or communication time) there is
no significant benefit of a relatively small altitude increase.
TABLE 6: CANDIDATE ORBIT PASS DURATIONS
CANDIDATE ORBIT PASS DURATION AND STANDARD DEVIATION
MIR 8 min 19 sec (G=lm21s)
GENERIC STS 8 min 13 sec (c=54s)
HUBBLE SVC FLIGHT 11 min 17 sec (a=58s)
SPACE STATION
ALPHA
8 min 37 sec (a=lm 14s)
Table 7 gives the nominal orbital lifetimes of the candidate orbits. Examination
of this data yields quite different results with regard to the value of not only increased
orbital altitude, but increased inclination. When comparing the Generic Shuttle and Space
Station orbits, a 10% increase in altitude yields a 55% increase in orbital lifetime.
Similarly increasing the inclination of co-altitude orbits has a significant increase on
lifetime. Again, it should be stressed that the orbital lifetime predictions are intended for
comparison and not accuracy given the significant number of unchanged variables. What
is noteworthy, is that depending primarily on the solar cycle, there is a significant increase
in predicted orbital lifetimes in the 350 to 425 km altitude regime. Where this change
occurs varies with solar and ballistic factors. Figure 9 shows the altitude decay history for
the orbital life of a typical satellite, note the significant life increase for relatively small
altitude increase above 400 km. This observation is confirmed, expanded and quantified
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Figure 9: Typical Altitude Decay History
TABLE 7: CANDIDATE ORBIT PREDICTED LIFETIMES
CANDIDATE ORBIT PREDICTED ORBITAL LIFETIME
MIR 776 days
GENERIC STS 664 days




Table 8 presents the frequency of occurrence of passes for the candidate orbits.
With regard to the expected number of passes per day, the higher inclination orbit is
clearly superior. Additionally, the benefit of increasing inclination to 5 1 .6° appears to be
greater than that of an altitude increase to 600 km.
TABLE 8: CANDIDATE ORBIT FREQUENCY OF PASSES
CANDIDATE ORBITS AVERAGE # PASSES/DAY
MIR 4.2/ day
GENERIC STS 2.7/day
HUBBLE SVC FLIGHT 4.1 /day
SPACE STATION ALPHA 3.0/day
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What then is the most logical way to interpret the somewhat contradictory
results of the simulations, and how do factors affect the conclusions which result?
There were three significant differences in communication opportunities for the
candidate orbits. The HST orbit has the longest average communication window of any
candidate orbit. The Mir has significantly larger number of passes over PANSAT'
s
projected lifetime than all orbits except HST. The HST orbit lifetime therefore would far
outdistance any of the other orbits and provides more lifetime communication opportunity.
This orbit would in fact yield far more life than PANSAT could gainfully employ, or for
which PANSAT is likely to be operational in any event.
Over the calculated life of the orbits the Mir orbit would provide over twice
the communication minutes as would the 'generic' Shuttle mission, and approximately
25% more communication minutes than the Space Station Freedom orbit. Note this is
based on straight multiplication of mean pass time and expected number of passes (over
the life of the orbit) and does not recompute pass statistics for orbital decay over the life
of the orbit. If that were taken into account however the advantage would even further lie
with Mir versus an equal altitude 28.5° inclined orbit since decreasing orbital altitude
would affect communication more severely with a satellite whose inclination is
significantly less than that of the ground station's latitude.
A sample run of the 'generic' Shuttle orbit yields the following thumbnail
sketch of the effects. Based on the LIFE4 calculated orbital decay, after one year the
altitude was estimated to be ~ 335 km. Based on this altitude, pass times for the same
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maximum elevation have reduced by about 20-25 sec. Fortunately, it appears that 28.5° is
close enough to the NPS latitude to avoid overwhelming degradation of the
communication opportunities until extremely late in the orbit's life.
4. Other Considerations
The key considerations affecting the analysis that have not been examined in
detail will now be discussed. The line of sight visibility for NPS may be slightly greater
than 10° in some directions due to terrain or obstructions depending on final ground
station antenna placement. This would primarily affect the lower inclination orbits since
that is where every pass would be in its entirety, but for a 51° orbit much fewer passes
would be influenced by a directional terrain effect. For the above reasons, antenna
tracking of higher inclination s/c is much more dynamic and susceptible to temporary loss
of signal due to mechanical tracking errors. The likelihood of tracking errors; however, is
less than that of low elevation obscuration exceeding 10° in some cases.
Political considerations may make the targeted launch window fairly restrictive.
A second Hubble repair mission, Mir rendezvous missions and Space Station assembly
flights seem to threaten extreme difficulty in making a manifest. Obviously with 6 Mir
missions in the target window, this option may be the most achievable. If a launch date
slide extends past a year, then more Space Station assembly flights become open. Owing
to the extreme high visibility mission and high altitude, ergo lower payload capacity, the
HST repair mission may in fact be unachievable.
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5. Conclusions and Follow Up Studies
a. Mission Tradeoffs
The results of this study indicate that PANSAT should target the Mir
missions as the most desirable. Given the influence on PANSAT operations of the solar
cycle, [Ref. 19:p. 14] it warrants consideration with regard to mission preference. With
regard to this factor the early Mir missions, STS-81 and 82, occur just prior to solar
minimum and are the clear best choices. The communication advantage comes in the form
of number of opportunities. With packet communications the length of a communication
window does not limit the size or amount of data that can be transmitted as files can be
transmitted over more than one pass. Moreover, experience with the current ground
station at NPS has shown pass times of five to six minutes to be more than sufficient for
nominal size file transfers at data rates substantially lower than those at which PANSAT
will operate. So clearly, a higher frequency of passes directly converts into operational
flexibility. Instead of there being a need to utilize every pass opportunity the ground
station can be more selective and provide a logistically easier schedule. Additionally,
during the critical immediate post launch period, four pass opportunities a day will be a
significant advantage over two or three in initializing PANSAT and verifying status and
operational capability. The higher inclination orbit offers less opportunity for terrain
induced low elevation losses. Antenna tracking of higher inclination orbits is more
dynamic but well within the capability of a ground station to perform, so this is not
considered to be a significant factor.
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A Mir rendezvous mission also achieves an altitude that is somewhat
higher than a typical STS mission, which means that being manifested on one of the
missions with no hard orbital requirements (STS- 83,87 and 89) brings about the
distinctive possibility of an altitude of less than 370 km. As cursory lifetime analyses
indicate, lifetimes severely shorten for even small altitude reductions below approximately
400 km. A higher inclination orbit offers less communication degradation with orbital
decay as a considered factor.
The HST would offer a significantly longer lifetime, but one that is
unnecessarily long for PANSAT' s mission. The extreme altitude of this mission lowers
the payload capacity and therefore makes it a more competitive manifest. The additional
200 km also implies an additional free space path loss (FSPL). The particular amount of
increased FSPL will vary with geometry. The additional loss is minimized to 2 dB at low
elevation and reaches a maximum of almost 4dB when directly overhead. The maximum
occurs at a point that is well within the link margin but the additional 2dB loss occurs at
the point of minimum link margin.
A secondary option should be to pursue mission assignment on the
Hubble service flight, STS-85, in order to maximize lifetime, since as the schedule gets
further away from solar minimum the orbital lifetimes decrease significantly. Space
Station Alpha missions offer an attractive option due to the increased altitude (compared
to Mir) but should be pursued only if PANSAT's schedule slides significantly and the HST
service flight is not attainable.
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b. Additional Questions
The results of the above study brought about some further issues in
company with the ones that were addressed. If 51.6° inclination is better than 28.5°, what
is the optimum inclination? If the Mir orbit is achieved, what will the operational schedule
look like over time? Is there a need to specify orbital parameters other than orbital
altitude, eccentricity and inclination?
(1) Optimum Inclination. The study detailed above strongly indicates
that, with respect to number of communication opportunities over a given period, an
orbital inclination of 51.6° is clearly superior to 28.5°, given similar altitudes. Since
frequency of communication opportunities has been shown to be the most desirable
parameter to maximize, is there then, an optimum inclination with regard to this
parameter? If there is an optimum inclination, and it can be determined, that inclination
can be used in the CPR document as the desired inclination, and while it may not be
feasible for PANSAT to be given that particular inclination, it would strengthen the case
for specifying an acceptable range.
To examine this issue, a 60 day analysis period was simulated for
orbits differing only in inclination, which ranged from 28.5° to 74°. The high end
inclination was determined on the basis of a prior simulation with 90° inclination, this
yielded fewer passes over time than the 28.5° orbit. Therefore, a first cut determined that
performance versus inclination was not constantly increasing and apparently did have
some maximum. A value of 74° was chosen as an estimate that would exceed the
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maximum. The results are presented graphically in Figure 10. Clearly the area of
optimum inclination can be seen to be in the region between 36°and 51.6° inclination. As
this simulation was primarily for narrowing down the range, further analysis is warranted.
Intermediate results are not presented, but the inclination was similarly narrowed through
a series of simulations, with the final range of inclinations narrowed to 44° to 48°. The
results of this final simulation are presented in and Figure 1 1
.












Figure 11: Optimum Inclination
The analysis indicates an optimum inclination of approximately
46.5°. Further examination of the issues involved yielded no positive conclusions as to
where exactly this value comes from or how to have predicted it prior to the data analyses.
However, the value does make intuitive sense given the following chain of reasoning.
Where do communication opportunities arise for a ground station, satellite combination?
The inclination should obviously be equal to or greater than the latitude of the ground
sight (Monterey, CA ~ 36.6° north) to allow for passes when the satellite is rising from the
ascending node and descending towards the descending node. Further, it should be close
enough in latitude so that when the satellite's nadir point is at its inclination latitude the
satellite is still in view of the ground station. Therefore the ground station's latitude and
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minimum elevation capability are determining factors. As the data bears out, an orbit with
inclination somewhat greater than the latitude of the ground station is the best option.
(2) Mir Orbit Operations. What effect will achieving a near Mir
orbit have on operations? Is there any evidence of periodicity with regard to the time of
passes occurring? The typical day of operations with a satellite in a Mir type orbit has
four passes. The passes generally occur in two sets of two, the sets being eight to twelve
hours apart and the two within each set being approximately 90 minutes separated. The
90 minutes is indicative of the orbital period and passes on two subsequent orbital
revolutions. The two sets of passes are indicative of a set as the satellite rises from the
ascending node and a set as the satellite descends toward the descending node. With all
the variables inherent to orbital motion, the periodicity question reduces to a search for a
way to further examine the data.
If there were in fact periodicity, it would be primarily dependent on
a limited number of variables. Motions of the satellite within its orbit, the earth's rotation,
and orbital precession are the basic considerations for a first order analysis. Orbital
precession will be the focal point of consideration due to the substantially greater time
constant governing that variable in comparison to the constants governing the motion of
the spacecraft within its orbit and the earth's rotation. Examination of the other two
variables is beyond the scope of this analysis. Orbital precession (d£2/dt ) is given by [Ref.
21 :p. 210] the following equation:
dft/dt = -1.5 [J2R2/a(l-e2)] M cos(i)
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where: J 2 = .0010826, R = Earth equatorial radius, a = semi-major axis, e = eccentricity, M
= Mean motion,and i = inclination. Calculating this for Mir gives a value of -5.09°/day
which implies a complete revolution or period of 70.8 days. This implies that over time,
all times of the day will be available as passes. As inspection of the data indicates, the pass
times on a given day are heavily weighted to a particular portion of that day approximately
ten hours in length. Adjustment of the ten hour period containing the overwhelming
majority of the passes likewise should occur on the same 70 day period. That adjustment
should be slow to progress, which means that a particular communication window region
will be the norm a substantial length of time.
The orbital precession calculation was primarily used as an initial
approximation with which to design an analysis to bring out any evidence of periodicity.
This analysis consisted of a simulation for a single satellite against the NPS ground sight
over a 180 day period. Observations were counted for a day divided into two hour blocks
to cover an orbital period. These counts were evaluated in ten day blocks in order to
quantify progress in sufficiently small increments in comparison to the expected period.
Histograms were then constructed for each ten day period, and evaluated for trends. The
results, (Appendix, Figures 15-24) lend strong credibility to the argument for periodicity.
The general shape of each histogram was remarkably similar, with virtually all
observations occurring within a 12 hour block, with two spikes of significantly higher
frequency blocks about six to eight hours apart. Subsequent histograms show the general
reduction of pass times by approximately four hours in ten days. This indicates a
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periodicity on the order of 60 days, close enough to 70 considering the approximations
involved in the first estimate. Further, when comparing histograms 60 days apart the
similarity is generally even stronger, (Figure 12) with only minor count differences in some
of the blocks.
As a final step in the analysis, another method of data analysis was
employed to lend credibility to, or disqualify the above hypothesis of 60 day periodicity.
The hypothesis now under consideration became: If there were periodic tendencies in the
pass times, over the course of a period the probability of a sighting in a particular time
block should be equal for all two hour blocks. To investigate this hypothesis, histograms
of accumulated pass data were constructed for different lengths of the simulation,
(Appendix, Figures 25-28) including, 60 days, 110 days, 150 days, and 180 days. The
particular two hour block probabilities for the 150 day histograms varied from a low of =
.063 to a maximum of = . 1 1 , which is also approximately equal to the expected probability
or .083 +/- .02. The probabilities for the 110 day period varied from = .065 to = .095, a
smaller range. The probabilities for the 60 day period varied from =.077 to = .095, a
smaller range still. Finally the probabilities for the 180 day period varied from = .078 to
=..088, easily the smallest variation.
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What then can be inferred from the ranges of probabilities encountered?
If there were periodicity, then it would be reasonable to expect the probabilities for
individual blocks to be closest to equal over a full period and increasingly so over integer
multiples of full periods, and as the total number of observations significantly increased.
The data bears this out; the 150 day sample, while drawn from a larger data set than most,
is the farthest away from a full period and has the widest range of probabilities. The 1 10
day sample is closer to a full period and the range has reduced. The 60 day sample is at
the expected period and the range of probabilities here is smaller still. Finally, the 180 day
sample has the smallest range of probability variation and is an integer multiple of the
expected period. The facts clearly indicate periodicity of approximately 60 days. If the
reduced range of probabilities for the 180 day sample were purely a result of increasing
numbers, then the 150 day sample would bear this out as well, but it does not.
D. IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL CONCERNS
Research priorities with respect to operations should be to thoroughly develop the
initialization sequence for the spacecraft, and define when and how proof of concept is
achieved. What is the exact sequence of events that must occur to begin normal
operations for PANSAT? These issues are in some ways critical to many other aspects of
operations plans. The project has targeted a goal of two years on orbit. This fact has
significantly impacted the project schedule in that two years is achievable by a launch in
late 1996 through mid 1997 [Ref. 19:p. 49] due to the solar cycle. This decision
effectively imposes a true deadline, which is certainly a new consideration for the
project. If the proof of concept criteria were already established, the required on orbit
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time could be more realistically evaluated. Developing the initialization sequence should
be an integral process with system design since it establishes subsystem interfaces and
working relationships. Failure analysis is another area of high priority research. While
telemetry design is already somewhat mature, designing fault identification into telemetry
reporting has not been sufficiently addressed. The reverse engineering process of fault
analysis can be made significantly easier if it is considered in the telemetry design phase.
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V. MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION
A key assumption in the development of this thesis was that the PANSAT project is
subject to stringent fiscal limitations. What budgetary assets are available must be spread
between salaries, research, test and fabrication equipment purchasing, parts and
consumables purchasing, and operating expenses to name but a few. Of the incomplete
list given above, the most significant fiscal commitment goes to the salaries of the SSAG,
PANSAT staff. A further assumption of this thesis was that the analysis first would be
conducted without regard to the possibility of increasing the SSAG staff. That possibility
will be dealt with as a separate issue. In light of the above delineated assumptions, the
only realistic approach to improving the overall development process becomes the
examination of how the available personnel are being used to complete the project. In
other words, what managerial strategy should be pursued to better match assets to
requirements. The current organizational structure sees only the SSAG staff engineers
physically within the project management's cognizance. Are there feasible steps that can
be taken that will increase the effectiveness of faculty and student contributions to the
project? Can these contributions be effectively matched to project requirements on a
timely basis, thus enabling the staff to proceed to subsequent development areas?
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A. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
1. Tasking and Positions
As the only physically employed component of the development effort, the
engineering staff will be the first focus of an examination of the project structure. The
SSAG PANSAT engineering team consists of a project manager (PM), systems engineer,
EPS engineer, DCS/communications coordinating engineer, ground station engineer,
system master plan/testing engineer, DCS/communications design engineer, and a model
maker/fabricator. Given their status as SSAG staff, all members of the engineering team
have additional responsibilities and commitments outside of the PANSAT project. The
above listing only gives titles and not responsibilities. The particular responsibility
assignments are primarily coordinated by the program manager, and are not nearly so
clearly defined. The systems engineer is also the lead engineer for structural subsystem
development. The EPS and DCS/communications design and coordinating engineers are
all involved in overlapping details of the EPS design, interfaces, DCS design and interfaces
and communications payload development. The systems engineer and testing engineer
handle overall project documentation and coordination with outside agencies in general.
The program manager maintains and updates a master project schedule via
inputs from the engineering team with regard to subtask progress. More detailed work
breakdowns are maintained by most members of the engineering staff.
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2. Issues
There is no formal program plan. A program plan is an essential tool to
develop the logical approach to, and the implementation and control of a program. The
effective program plan should analyze program objectives and work required in light of
cost and schedule estimations. The program plan [Ref 22:p. 2-1] should contain an
overview, a technical summary, management approach, procurement approach, and
budgetary and project control plans. These items are the basis of a well-organized project,
and should be used as a starting point for increasingly detailed planning efforts.
The project manager for PANSAT has had, and continues to have significant
difficulty obtaining adequately detailed schedule plans from subsystem coordinators.
Certain aspects of development, largely due to greater student interest, have continually
received more attention with regard to schedule and design development than have other
areas. The result is that a macroscopic schedule has been generally arrived at and decided
upon (perhaps by default) without sufficient detailed development of design concepts and
associated schedules to ensure that the overall schedule can be met. A specific example of
this issue occurred when a recent thesis recommended a late 1996 launch in order to
achieve launch during favorable solar radiation conditions. The decision was thereby
made to proceed with the project in order to meet that launch date. That launch date
incurs the requirement for a fully operational PANSAT by early 1996 (six months prior to
launch) for Launch Vehicle integration. In the opinion of the author, there is no firm
evidence to support the prediction of a fully operational and tested satellite by that date.
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The management plan for PANSAT consists of an expanded listing of
subsystem coordinators, and the associated upper level tasks for which they are
responsible. Beyond the basic subsystems, the areas covered also include software,
spacecraft architecture and configuration, solar panels, testing, operations and
documentation, and the high level responsibilities of the project manager and systems
engineer. Under each of the coordinators for the above areas, specific responsibility is
assigned for the upper level tasking. This work breakdown is a good initial guideline, but
it is insufficient. The Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST) organizes a work
breakdown structure (WBS) somewhat differently than does the SSAG. The top level
work breakdown structure is organized at three levels. Figure 13 shows an (incomplete)
top level WBS for a typical system. Level one is the program level, while the second level
can best be described as principal tasks. The third levels are subtasks and subsystems.
[Ref. 23:p. 2-5]
The second level of the work breakdown structure separates a project into the
top level tasks of program management, systems engineering, subsystem development,
software development, systems effectiveness, parts procurement and processing,
spacecraft integration and test, test system development, and ground station development.
Program management includes planning, control, contract management, and budgeting.
Systems engineering includes system requirements definition, bread and brassboard
systems engineering, and technical interface activities. The subsystem level breakdown of
a typical systems engineering task is presented as Figure 14. Spacecraft systems
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effectiveness includes product assurance, reliability engineering, quality assurance, design
analysis, and safety. Integration and test involves test planning, execution and analysis
while test system development implies the hardware and software development associated
with performing the testing. [Ref 23 :p. 2-5] All other tasks are considered self
explanatory.
It is readily apparent that the approaches to work breakdown structure taken
by the SSAG and NCST are fundamentally quite different. Almost all of PANSAT's
breakdown occurs vertically down a single level (Subsystem Development) of the
recommended structure of the NCST model. Subsystem coordinators also perform
subtasks horizontally across the NCST model, i.e., subtasks under other level two tasks
than subsystem development. Subsystem coordinators procuring parts, developing test
plans, and developing software are but a few examples. The reason for this disparity is
simply the fact that personnel assets for an NCST type work breakdown structure do not
seem to exist for the SSAG. So while the organizational structure of the NCST model is
not readily transferrable to a project of PANSAT's scope, the details of the work
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Figure 14: Sample Systems Engineering Work Breakdown Structure
3. Recommendations
The Naval Postgraduate School is not in the business of building satellites. It
is therefore reasonable to seek additional direction and evaluation from a reliable and
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unbiased source. It is the recommendation of this thesis to reorganize the project along
the lines of the Space Systems Division of the Naval Center for Space Technology at the
Naval Research Laboratory. The first step in this will be the development of a formal
program plan document. The development of a program plan is detailed in Reference 22.
The PANSAT work breakdown structure should be reorganized along the lines
of the NCST model (modified to PANSAT specifics). Coordinators should be assigned to
level two tasks; most personnel will need to assume responsibility for more than one top
level task. If this system is adopted it will benefit the project in a number of ways. First,
the probability of subtasks remaining unaddressed will be reduced because this model is
simply more thorough than the SSAG model. The SSAG breakdown meanwhile should
be used to assign lower level tasking to ensure that no previously noted tasks are omitted.
Secondly, the adoption of a structure employed by a proven spacecraft development
facility only makes sense in the absence of contradictory SSAG corporate knowledge.
Additionally, the adoption of this structure increases the facility for outside program
audits, examinations, and recommendations. Finally, this breakdown improves the work
distributions and definitions of two critical team members, the PM and the systems
engineer.
Among the recommendations that are implicit to the adoption of the NCST
work breakdown structure, is the realignment of the duties of the PM and systems
engineer. The PM should assume primary responsibility for program documentation.
Coordinators should provide required documentation needs and requests that would be
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maintained updated and audited for completeness by the PM. Documentation of critical
decisions and direction has plagued the project since its inception. Proof of this assertion
is the near complete unavailability of trade studies, decision support documentation,
requirements determination papers and the like. Student theses provide the primary
documentation of project history. Electronic documentation of recently developed design
details and decisions exists but doesn't cover the early stages of the program.
The systems engineering duties should be restructured along the lines of the
classic systems engineer. [Ref. 3] This one position, due to the requirement of impartiality
with regard to design compromises, should not be performed in conjunction with any
other responsibilities with regard to PANSAT. Overall project design, development, and
interface and integration management are too critical to the success of any project to risk
their compromise by an otherwise tasked systems engineer.
B. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ISSUES
As developed in the preceding sections of this chapter, a critical problem that
continues to evade resolution is the issue of staffing. Specifically, there is simply not a
large enough staff to complete all of the required details necessary to a successful program
in the time before PANSAT' s anticipated launch date. Unless the decision is made to take
on additional engineering staff, if the project is to succeed, the slack must be taken up by
some other physical asset. The only options available are to work smarter and faster, to
purchase rather than develop hardwware and software where feasible, and to supplement
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the engineering staff with increased and improved faculty and student participation. What
follows is an examination of how these options might be accomplished.
Faculty participation in the past has been marked by outcomes that fall well short of
expectations in more than one case. Professors have withdrawn from project involvement
for political reasons and of all project personnel are singularly beyond any management
control and in some cases even influence.
1. Other Participants
a. Students
The single greatest resource available to the PANSAT project is the
officer students, principally from the Space Systems curricula. To date this asset by any
standard has been employed far short of its potential. Student participation is
predominantly voluntarily, excepting the infrequent class with a PANSAT related project
requirement (e.g., AA-4831 for the Space Operations Curriculum). Other participation
largely consists of thesis research in the Space Systems Engineering, Electrical and
Computer Engineering, and Space Systems Operations fields. Some additional
participation in the form of directed study projects related to PANSAT also contribute;
although not all student participation has any significant effect on the project.
Students in the Space Systems Operations and Engineering curricula are
available in varying degree to participate in PANSAT. The operations curriculum has
three unspecified elective slots in a normal course matrix. The student is allowed to
choose an elective sequence to fit his or her needs and or wishes. The operations
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curriculum has several core courses taught by SSAG professors and a quarterly one hour
Space Systems seminar; one class begins each academic year. The engineering curriculum
has many of the same characteristics with the noted exception of no free elective openings
in its matrix. The engineering curriculum, however, has two separate classes each
academic year.
Student participation in the project could be significantly increased and
improved in a number of ways. The majority of space systems students do not arrive with
a pre-determined thesis. If the Space Operations class SO-31 (September 1994 graduates)
is a representative one, the majority of students do not choose theses until they have been
at NPS for nearly a year. Students not having selected a thesis by a predetermined time
(e.g., the start of the third quarter) should be encouraged to select one from a list of topics
that the PANSAT team has generated. This would certainly be a non-traditional academic
policy, but it should be remembered that the students are first and foremost military
officers, well versed in non-traditional requirements. This policy would quickly reduce the
number of unaddressed topics for PANSAT, while expanding the bounds of academic
enhancement. In addition to this thesis selection, all incoming space students should be
exposed to the PANSAT project early on and encouraged to participate. Instead of being
required to attend all SS-4000 (Space System Seminars), which are often beyond many
first and second quarter students, they should attend SS-4003 (PANSAT Design
Meetings). This could be done on a quarterly basis, i.e., SS-4000 for a quarter and SS-
4003 the next. The design meetings can be easily restructured to provide an in depth
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introduction to PANSAT for early students. For students approaching or beyond thesis
selection a separate course should be designed as an operations or engineering working
group (depending on specific curricula). The opportunity for this course exists for all
space students in the form of SS-4000. Additional opportunities exist for the operations
students in that a sequence of (SS-4900) electives can be designed as an operations
development sequence. These electives can be administered by SSAG instructors and
consist of group and/or individual projects of timely importance to the project.
The author does not anticipate that the above proposals are likely to be
well received initially; the academic mind set must, however, allow room for consideration
for two reasons in particular. First, the proposal goes directly to improving project
performance with regard to the two primary objectives. Second, there is an already
significant, and ever expanding wish list of topics to be addressed prior to launch, and staff
can not possibly address even the essential topics, let alone the "nice to know" ones.
b. Faculty
The difficulties of improving faculty input seem somewhat overwhelming.
The nature of faculty participation is, like students, voluntary. Unlike students, however,
there is no avenue for requiring additional participation, nor obviously does there exist the
necessity to produce a thesis. The SSAG unlike other true academic departments has
limited influence over even SSAG faculty, who are also associated with an academic
department. Even after a faculty member has joined the project, there is nothing to
prevent subsequent withdrawal at any time. The only way of increasing participation is to
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make it more attractive for faculty to participate. Research funding is the best, and
possibly only way to accomplish this, except for those who are genuinely and deeply
interested in the project itself.
In light of the inherent difficulties of managing faculty participation,
direct reliance on additional faculty should be avoided by the SSAG staff. Students
seeking thesis advisors should be the primary contact with any faculty not currently and
actively involved in the project.
2. Decision Authority
How are decisions affecting the project made and what documentation exists
of those decisions? This question is more difficult to answer than would reasonably be
expected. The decision making authority for the project resides at any of three basic levels
dependent upon the nature and potential impact of the decision to be made. The ultimate
decision authority rests with the principal investigator and to a reduced extent with the
project lead. Top level, high impact decisions are made at this level with full consideration
of engineering staff input. The engineering staff has periodic Planning and Integration (P
& I) Meetings to develop details either for top level decision or to decide second level
items. Decisions at the second level do not typically affect top level system design per se,
but rather how some requirement is fulfilled. This is done in the meeting climate to ensure
full staff understanding of the issues and implications. The third basic level of decision
rests with the subsystem coordinators and generally implies an issue that has no
implications outside of that subsystem.
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Documentation of third tier design decisions exists primarily in the form of a
design log, available to the SSAG staff. Second tier decision documentation is via
Planning and Integration Meeting minutes similarly maintained. Top level design
decisions, primarily those made early in the project's life cycle, are, to the knowledge of
the author, not maintained or available. The design log and P & I minutes document
relatively recent decisions only. This lack of documentation of critical decisions made
early on in the process makes project analysis infinitely more difficult. Word of mouth
reasoning behind significant decisions has mandated countless hours of duplicate efforts on
the part of more project participants than can reasonably be determined.
Decisions that have been made in the past should be reconstructed and fully
documented with regard to what was considered, what was assumed, what was decided,
what were the alternative choices, and the potential effects of the decision. Decisions
made henceforth should be similarly documented and maintained in a sole source project
design and decision log. If a decision cannot be documented, and the above reasoning
completed in detail, that decision has not been sufficiently investigated. Reconstruction of
past decisions may seem pointless, but the potential avoidance offuture duplicate work
should be fully considered before dismissing this proposition.
C. MANAGEMENT PLAN
The overriding intent of this thesis was to provide recommendations to the project in
order to improve overall performance towards the successful fulfillment of stated goals.
This section, as a management plan, is the forum for those recommendations. This plan
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can be divided into three logical areas. First, a review of project goals deals with how the
project is proceeding towards those goals and with specific recommendations regarding
those goals. Next, assessing the project's direction deals with fine tuning smaller scale
considerations than overall goals. Finally, an examination of PANSAT would not be
complete without developing a logical approach to the long term future of the project.
1. Project Goals
The PANSAT project is at a critical point in all respects. The decision has
been made to proceed with a targeted launch window beginning in September 1996
through early 1997. This gives concrete end times to the project's schedule. Specifically,
this schedule now requires a completely assembled and tested space vehicle ready for
Shuttle Integration possibly as early as March, but more likely by the fall of 1996. This
has serious implications to the stated goals of the project.
The primary goal of the project must now become what was previously
secondary; that of developing, fabricating, launching, and operating a satellite
communications system. The reasons for this are self evident. A project on a deadline can
not afford the luxury of a flexible schedule. Student involvement by its very nature makes
a flexible schedule an inescapable reality.
Educational enhancement is not necessarily curtailed by this fundamental
change in approach; the manner of implementation, however, must be altered. Education
must be pursued where available, but where it does not impact the project schedule. The
most significant manifestation of this fact should be in the availability of the engineering
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team. // the staff is to succeed in this undertaking, then satellite construction must be
their overriding concern, to the exclusion of students. This entails the necessity for
students to fit into the staff's schedules and work on topics not intimately involved in the
overall schedule. This is a hard reality and one that will require management's complete
enforcement and support. It is directly against the charter of the SSAG to put students
second but if the project is to succeed, PANSAT must come before all else. This aspect of
the recommended policy may be more prove easier for the staff to implement than for
management to openly support.
What are the alternatives to this fundamental change in philosophy for the
project? The first option is to remain in the current approach of education first and giving
effort to launch PANSAT less than total emphasis. This choice, while not necessarily
doomed to failure, certainly lessens the likelihood of a successful launch. The third option
is to admit before further commitment is made that NPS is not in the satellite production
business, and that PANSAT faces insurmountable obstacles in making the launch window.
This will leave the education of students as the primary concern of the SSAG. The
problems with this approach are ( 1 ) the loss of funding support that would result from
program cancellation, and (2) the difficulty in getting funding for a following project, since
PANSAT would be seen as a failed program. While it is true that a large reason for the
DoD based financial support of the project is due to its educational basis, the value of that
education would be best demonstrated by a successful satellite launch and operation. This
view shows that the two principal objectives of the program from its inception are
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inextricably tied, and that neither can be fully achieved without the other. In light of the
above discussion, the only reasonable choice seems to be the realignment of primary and
secondary goals. The time to begin the transition to a satellite production facility is past
due.
2. Direction
If the decision is made to make the completion of the project the primary
objective, what then are the details of that course of action? This decision requires the full
support and commitment of all involved; lip service alone will not suffice to allow the
engineering team to pursue their responsibilities adequately to the project. The potential
impact of this action on students is significant but short term, and it can be easily managed
to minimize the detrimental effects. This approach does not make student participation
unwelcome; it does make the student more responsible for his or her own support. The
largest effect may be in the type of projects that students will pursue.
The large majority of theses coming out of the PANSAT project thus far have
been engineering in nature. As designs become increasingly detailed and fabrication
begins, the opportunity for masters level engineering work decreases. At this stage,
however, the opportunity is just beginning for operational theses. This aspect of the
PANSAT project has received minima] attention to this point. The operational aspects of
the project are not only crucial to success, they are also the best ways to pursue
continued education without adversely affecting the project's progress.
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There are still a large number of thesis opportunities in every aspect of
PANSAT; however, the project-wide attitude is that these opportunities are well known.
That is not the case; the available thesis topics are seen only after close scrutiny on the
part of prospective students. The transition away from educational emphasis should begin
with the subsystem coordinators' thorough evaluation of the tasks remaining. The result
fits well into the previously recommended new work breakdown structure. This task
description improves schedule knowledge and thereby not only allows a student better
information as to available thesis topics but gives a concrete time frame during which the
work must be completed. In this manner the subsystem coordinators and student can
easily determine whether or not the student fits into the project. This underscores the
fundamental change in approach; the student must fit into the project, no longer should the
project have to find a place for the student. The importance of thoroughness in the
development of the task evaluation can not be overstated. This identification of needs and
schedule will be the principal connection between staff needs and student participation.
Student participation can be optimized by well-developed projects or squandered by half-
hearted lists.
The project has undergone two design reviews, both largely internal. Given
the current development schedule, virtually every subsystem should be in, at a minimum,
the detailed design phase by early 1995. The project should solicit a thorough and
encompassing critical review by an unbiased expert analysis team to be completed by
March 1995. One year prior to launch vehicle integration should be the latest acceptable
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time for such a review. The Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST) at the NRL has
significant experience in space related projects of all size and complexity, not to mention
projects on extremely tight schedules. If a team from NCST could be brought to NPS for
a program review, the resulting insights could prove invaluable. The teams unbiased
evaluation should be given every consideration, even if that evaluation was that the
project would not work. This may be the latest time to cancel the project, were that
decision to be made, without catastrophic repercussions.
Close examination of the PANSAT project reveals some critical management
issues. Without citing examples, an overriding impression of the development team is that
the complexities of detailed design are getting in the way of the bigger picture issues.
There are numerous instances of designs put on hold awaiting details from another
subsystem coordinator who is awaiting details from yet another, and so on. The problem
of too much focus on details impeding the basic design is the domain of the systems
engineer. Recent steps have addressed this issue, but constant attention to this
phenomenon is warranted. This reason alone is justification of the earlier
recommendation that the systems engineer be relieved of all extraneous responsibilities.
The dual role as structures subsystem coordinator can possibly compromise the purpose of
a systems engineer to coordinate, integrate and compromise to attain the best overall
system. The systems engineer and program manager must assume more demanding
management styles; to this end they need the full and open support of the principle
investigator and project lead. The development team gives the general impression of
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reaching decisions based on personality and strength of argument. The systems engineer
and program manager simply need more basic authority, and it should be exercised. In
the months to come it will become a necessity to demand more from the team and that
authority must be put in place now, before it is too late.
3. The Future
The ideal realization of the goals of PANSAT would be for its success to bring
about a new more ambitious project. The lessons learned from this undertaking will
enable a project of significantly greater scope to be pursued. The start of that future
undertaking, however, should occur now. The SSAG has the unique opportunity to start
the follow on project without affecting PANSAT. The key to this is in the approach to the
system. Recalling discussions of some previous chapters, the project should begin with a
team of Space Operations students. A design team determines and develops a mission
need or requirement. That mission is evaluated and analyzed, resulting in a listing of
functional (system) requirements along with candidate architectures. The Space
Operations core class, SS-4001 (Decisions and Space Systems), is a perfect forum for
this effort. Not only does this proposal fall directly in line with the course description but
it has the additional benefit of being an in-place, (i.e., funded) course in the curriculum.
The candidate architectures are analyzed by an engineering team for feasibility and the
combined teams generate a candidate list of alternatives and recommendations. Along
with the candidates is a refined list of functional requirements. The candidates are
evaluated and a decision is made within the SSAG. A key consideration remains the
inclusion of education as a principal goal of the project at this level. After a decision is
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made, the engineering design work converts the functional requirements into physical
requirements and thereby also develops the selected candidate's architecture into
subsystems and assemblies, etc. Since the operations team was involved from the start,
operations can be addressed in the initial stages of the project in order to provide crucial
supporting information for key design decisions, as well as to frame and/or perform trade
studies towards those design decisions. It is worthy of mention that a critical difficulty in
PANSAT' s design freeze is the way the project works with functional requirements. The
functional requirements document is an assortment of physical and functional. Further,
the requirements document has been routinely altered to meet the physical design as it
developed. This approach is fundamentally flawed. A system's functional requirements
should define a systems purpose, intent and basic approach. It should not be an
engineering design document. Additionally, such a document should not be altered to
meet what can be built, rather, the functional and then physical requirements should have
been adequately developed before design work got to this stage and changes to it should
be the exception. In other words, the design should be worked to meet requirements, not
vice versa.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PASSDOWN
The future of the PANSAT program, as detailed in earlier chapters, hinges on many
details of engineering design and fabrication, operations development and planning, and
thorough testing. A failure on the part of any one of a large number of these details could
prove catastrophic, and yet success will not even be ensured if every single one is
adequately addressed. As with any complex systems development project, the
interrelationships of all of these factors make it impossible to isolate and deal with any
single issue at a time. This thesis raised a significant number of these issues that will
require timely resolution in order for PANSAT to succeed. It is certainly true that there
are a significant number of issues that have not been identified herein of equal or perhaps
greater concern. The single largest contribution of this thesis may, in fact, be the
identification of the fact that there are not only significant identified difficulties with the
project as it now stands, but that it is reasonable to assume the presence of unidentified
potentially fatal complications.
In the opinion of the author, the largest obstacle facing the project is the lack of
organization and continuity in the design and fabrication effort. The organization of the
team and project planning are unwieldy to carry off a project of this magnitude. The
project would be better served to adopt a more military style hierarchical chain of
command structure in order to increase accountability and responsibility. The goals of the
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project and design goals of individual subsystems need more focus and less
experimentation. The time for considering new design possibilities has passed. The
current design state must be dealt with in the most effective manner to put the pieces
together and make the system work. The presence of students and faculty only complicate
the dynamics of the organization. A more focused, better managed approach to handling
these participants has become a necessity.
The electrical power production capability of PANSAT is one aspect of the
engineering effort that has been a constant source of misunderstanding. Although the
power shortcomings are expected to be manageable through operational methods, this
thesis has highlighted a serious miscalculation with regard to how much power the
spacecraft will produce. Operational methods can only address situations that are fully
understood; if status schedules are put into effect for PANSAT without knowing their full
and complete implications a bad situation will only degrade.
In the opinion of the author, the decision authorities for the project need to give
serious consideration to the realistic chances for PANSAT being completed and ready for
launch as it is currently scheduled. There seems to be an optimistic attitude regardless of
the complications. The concern this raises is that the problems of which the project is
aware may be correctable, but the problems that kill projects are the ones that are
unforeseen until too late. The PANSAT project seems ripe with unforeseen problems;
every investigation of one issue brings others to light that are often more serious.
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PANSAT needs aggressive audits in two particular areas. The overall system should
undergo an independent critical design review by an agency such as NRL in order to
validate in house estimates of likelihood of success. An audit of the testing program
should also be solicited as this issue goes directly to meeting the requirements to be
launched. The results of these audits should be given every possible consideration. The
cancellation of any project may be a more attractive alternative than pursuing a program
doomed to public failure.
The engineering staff should be supplemented if at all fiscally possible. The largest
two shortcomings of the PANSAT staff are in size (too small) and experience at the
middle management level. A space-experienced managing engineer would be the most
beneficial single addition to the project. The necessary ingredient that such an addition
would provide is an ability to focus on the larger picture and to impart that focus to the
development staff.
Follow-on tasking for future Student Project Officers (SPO) was one of the goals at
the outset of this thesis. One obvious direction is to follow through on the specific
recommendations proposed throughout the individual chapters of this report. The best
initial task for the new SPO would be to carry through a new systems analysis within a
few months of taking the position. This is considered essential in light of the fast
approaching Critical Design Review and any external audits resulting from
recommendations herein. The specific areas of interest will be by individual preference;
however, in terms of chronological order, the answering of systems design questions and
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solidifying these issues should be the top priority. The next priority should probably be
development of testing issues raised and a comprehensive test plan. For the most part,
operational issues can be carried out without quite the same time criticality as the above
topics, a notable exception being the need to establish coordinating activities with the
Hitchhiker, GSFC, and NASA program offices. Ideally, an increase in student activities in
these particular areas would allow the SPO to oversee and guide rather than personally
undertake these efforts. A major obstacle when beginning this effort was the definition of
the role of SPO. As the management structure of the project does not have any defined
gaps in job description, the SPO has no readily identifiable role. Any new SPO must tailor
the specific approach to their particular strengths and weakness, as well as to the strengths
and weaknesses of the PANSAT project. The best fit in the course of this thesis was
determined to be as a more technical program manager and a less technical systems
engineer. In other words the SPO should be versed in both jobs and attempt to bridge
the gap between the two roles. This would be the best application of the likely skills and
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Figure 20: Period Six Histogram
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PANSAT Pass Probabilities
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Figure 26: Probabilities for 150 Day Sample
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Figure 28: Probabilities for 180 Day Sample
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